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 A New Compact for Sexual Privacy 
 
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming) 
 
Danielle Keats Citron 
Abstract 
Intimate life is under constant surveillance. Firms track people’s periods, hot 
flashes, abortions, sexual assaults, sex toy use, sexual fantasies, and nude photos. 
Individuals hardly appreciate the extent of the monitoring, and even if they did, 
little can be done to curtail it. What is big business for firms is a big risk for 
individuals. The handling of intimate data undermines the values that sexual 
privacy secures—autonomy, dignity, intimacy, and equality. It can imperil 
people’s job, housing, insurance, and other crucial opportunities. More often, 
women and minorities shoulder a disproportionate amount of the burden.  
Privacy law is failing us. Our consumer protection approach offers little 
protection. Not only is the private-sector’s handling of intimate information 
largely unrestrained, but it is treated as normative. This Article offers a new 
compact for the protection of sexual privacy. Civil rights and liberties, along with 
consumer protection, is at stake when firms amass intimate data. The new compact 
seeks to stem the tidal wave of collection, restrict certain uses of intimate data, and 
expand the suite of remedies available to courts. It draws upon the lessons of civil 
rights law in moving beyond procedural protections and in authorizing injunctive 
relief, including orders to stop processing intimate data. 
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A New Compact for Sexual Privacy 
 
Danielle Keats Citron* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Intimate life is under constant surveillance. Apps memorialize people’s 
menstruation cycles, fertility, and sexually transmitted infections.1 
Advertisers and analytics firms track searches and browsing on porn sites. 
Sex toys monitor the frequency and intensity of their owners’ use.2 Digital 
assistants record, transcribe, and store conversations in bedrooms and 
bathrooms.3  
 
In some contexts, people enter into relationships with the firms tracking 
their intimate lives.4 This is true when individuals subscribe to dating apps 
or purchase digital assistants. In other contexts, people have no connection 
with the firms handling their intimate data. Data brokers, cyber stalking 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Vice President, Cyber Civil Rights 
Initiative; 2019 MacArthur Fellow. I am grateful to William & Mary Law School for inviting 
me to give the George Wyeth Lecture, to faculty and students for their thoughtful 
comments, and to the law review for superb edits. Woodrow Hartzog, Mary Anne Franks, 
Neil Richards, Alan Butler, Sara Cable, Cameron Kerry, Kris Collins, Jennifer Daskal, John 
Davisson, Hany Farid, Ahmed Ghappour, Rebecca Green, Debbie Hellman, Laura 
Heymann, Ryan Kriger, Gary Lawson, Karen Levy, Tiffany Li, Linda McClain, Mike 
Meuer, Luis Alberto Montezuma, Jeanine Morris-Rush, Nancy Moore, Nate Oman, David 
Rossman, David Seipp, Kate Silbaugh, Jessica Silbey, Noah Stein, Peter Swire, Ari 
Waldman, and David Webber shaped the piece with their astute advice. Boston University 
Journal of Science & Technology Law kindly asked me to present this paper as the keynote of 
the 2019 data privacy symposium. Matt Atha, Rebecca Gutterman, Caroline Hopland, and 
Julia Schur provided extraordinary research assistance. Boston University School of Law, 
especially Dean Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Associate Dean Stacey Dogan, and Associate 
Dean David Webber. The MacArthur Foundation graciously supported this work.  
1 Privacy International, No Body’s Business But Mine: How Menstruation Apps Are Sharing 
Your Data (Sept. 9, 2019) https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3196/no-bodys-
business-mine-how-menstruation-apps-are-sharing-your-data. 
2 Steven Musil, Internet-connected vibrator connects with privacy lawsuit, CNET (Sept. 13, 
2016, 4:15 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/internet-connected-vibrator-we-vibe-
lawsuit-privacy-data/.  
3 Jennings Brown, The Amazon Alexa Eavesdropping Nightmare Came True, GIZMODO 
(Dec. 20, 2018, 11:24 AM), https://gizmodo.com/the-amazon-alexa-eavesdropping-
nightmare-came-true-1831231490. 
4 For instance, people subscribe to dating apps that record their sexual preferences and 
favorite positions, interest in threesomes, HIV status, and hookups. They use online 
services that facilitate testing for sexually transmitted infections and share the results with 
prospective partners. Kimberly Aquilina, STD testing? Yeah, There is an app for that, METRO 
(June 6, 2017), https://www.metro.us/body-and-mind/health/std-testing-syphilis-Biem-
app. 
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apps, and sites devoted to nonconsensual pornography and deep fake sex 
videos come to mind.5   
 
Whether anticipated and desired or unknown and unwanted by 
individuals, the tracking of intimate information is poised for explosive 
growth. Profits drive what I have previously described as the “data 
collection imperative.”6 For instance, analysts predict that within five years, 
the “femtech market”—menstruation, fertility, and sexual wellness apps—
will be a $50 billion industry.7  
 
The coin of the realm for digital services is personal data.8 At some level, 
people understand that online services are not actually free.9 But the firms 
intentionally structure the deal in a manner that obscures its lopsided 
nature. Individual consumers cannot fully grasp the potential risks, and 
few options exist for those who do (well, beyond not using the service). 
Firms have every incentive to reinforce the status quo from which they earn 
considerable profits.10 
 
The surveillance of intimate life garners significant returns with little 
risk for businesses.11 The opposite is true for individuals.12 The private 
sector’s collection, use, storage, and disclosure of intimate information 
undermines what I have elsewhere called sexual privacy—the ways people 
                                                 
5 Kashmir Hill, Data Brokers were selling lists of Rape Sufferers, FORBES (December 19, 
2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/12/19/data-broker-was-
selling-lists-of-rape-alcoholism-and-erectile-dysfunction-sufferers/#6aec189e1d53; 
Lorenzo Franceschi-Biccheirai & Joseph Cox, Inside the Stalkerware Surveillance Market, 
Where Ordinary People Tap Each Other’s Phones, MOTHERBOARD (April 18, 2017), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/53vm7n/inside-stalkerware-surveillance-market-
flexispy-retina-x; Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 WASHINGTON & LEE L. REV. 1243 
(2015). 
6 Danielle Keats Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1139, 
1141 (2018). 
7 Drew Harwell, Is Your Pregnancy App Sharing Your Intimate Data With Your Boss?, 
WASHINGTON POST (April 10, 2019). 
8 Chris Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Accounting for the Costs of the Internet's Most 
Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606 (2017). 
9 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019); JULIE COHEN, 
BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER (2019). 
10 Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Duty of Loyalty (on file with author). 
11 This pattern happens across the economy but is particularly problematic 
when it comes to sexual privacy, as I explore throughout this Article. 
12 Id.; see generally STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS 11 (2019) (explaining that 
firms collecting and processing private information “do not internalize the harms 
associated with consumer privacy and security breaches. Nor do they internalize negative 
externalities or potential misuses of data that impact people who are not their own 
customers.”). 
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manage the boundaries around intimate life.13 Sexual privacy concerns the 
body, particularly the parts of the body associated with sex, gender, 
sexuality, and reproduction. It concerns any and all information about 
people’s sex, gender, sexuality, and sexual and reproductive health. This 
includes on- and offline activities, interactions, communications, thoughts, 
searches. It concerns the decisions that people make about their intimate 
lives. This Article tackles the collection, use, storage, and disclosure of 
information implicating sexual privacy, a crucial subset of sexual privacy 
that I will refer to as intimate information or intimate data.14 
 
Sexual privacy is foundational for our personhood and essential for our 
ability to flourish as human beings.15 It enables sexual and gender 
experimentation and identity development.16 It frees us to express 
ourselves and to form intimate relationships and associations.17 It secures 
human dignity and equal opportunity.18 
 
Private-sector surveillance of intimate information strips individuals of 
their ability to decide who learns about their miscarriages, breakups, HIV 
infections, sexual assaults, and nude images. It undermines people’s self-
esteem as they see themselves as intimate parts and not as whole selves. 
When companies categorize and rank people as rape sufferers or escort 
users and nothing more, they give those individuals fractured identities. 
People’s self-expression is chilled. Fearful of unwanted surveillance, people 
stop using dating apps, fertility trackers, or digital assistants. They refrain 
from browsing sites devoted to gender experimentation, sexuality, and 
reproductive health.  
 
The harm can be profound. Intimate data reveals people’s physical and 
emotional vulnerabilities, which firms exploit to their advantage.19 When 
intimate data is leaked or disclosed to hackers and criminals, individuals 
face reputational ruin, blackmail, and extortion.20 When commercial hiring 
                                                 
13 Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1871 (2019). 
14 I will use the terms “intimate information” and “intimate data” interchangeably to 
refer to any and all information implicating sexual privacy. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. Sexual privacy protects the ability of people to be sexual on their own terms, 
including being asexual.  
17 Id. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 192-195 (2014). 
18 Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note, at. 
19 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
20 Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach 
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 739-45 (2018); Kate Fazzini, Ashley Madison Cyber-Breach, 5 Years 
Later, Users are Being Targeted with Sextortion Scams, CNBC (January 31, 2020), 
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intelligence companies use intimate data to mine, rank, and rate, people 
may unfairly fail to obtain job interviews.21 People’s insurance rates may 
rise because algorithms predict their need for expensive fertility treatments 
or gender reassignment surgeries.22 
 
These risks are not evenly distributed across society. Women and 
marginalized communities disproportionately bear the burden of private-
sector surveillance of intimate life. For instance, the fem-tech market will 
have a disproportionate impact on women in healthcare and insurance 
market.23 The majority of people appearing on sites devoted to revenge 
porn and deep fake sex videos are women and sexual minorities. For people 
with intersecting marginalized identities, the harm is compounded.24 The 
denial of equal opportunity in the wake of sexual privacy invasions is why 
I called for the recognition of “cyber civil rights” more than a decade ago.25 
 
Despite the enormity of these potential harms, intimate information 
lacks meaningful legal protection. American law generally treats privacy as 
a consumer protection matter. It focuses on policing firms’ notice to 
consumers about their data practices and any deception concerning those 
practices. For the most part, the collection, use, storage, and sharing of 
intimate data is enabled by this approach rather than restricted by it. 
Tracking intimate data is not just permissible, it is viewed as normative.26 
 
This Article offers a new compact for the protection of intimate 
information. As a start, we need to revise our understanding of the privacy 
                                                 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/31/ashley-madison-breach-from-2015-being-used-in-
sextortion-scams.html. 
21 Ifeoma Ajunwa & Daniel Greene, Platforms at Work: Automated Hiring Platforms and 
Other New Intermediaries in the Organization of Work, in WORK AND LABOR IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3248675; Mar Hicks, Hacking 
the Cis-tem, IEEE ANNALS OF THE HISTORY OF COMPUTING, vol. 41, 20 (Jan.-Mar 2019). 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8634814. See generally SAFIYA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS 
OF OPPRESSION (2018). 
22 See Jaden Urbi, “Some Transgender Drivers Are Being Kicked Off Uber’s App,” 
CNBC, August 8, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/08/transgender-uber-driver-
suspended-tech-oversight-facial-recognition.html; S.M. West, M. Whittaker & K. 
Crawford, DISCRIMINATING SYSTEMS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN AI (April 2019), 
available at https://ainowinstitute.org/discriminatingsystems.pdf. 
23 As discussed above, this is the explicit goal of fem-tech companies. 
24 Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, “Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy 
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification,” in Proceedings of the 1st Conference on 
Fairness, Accountability and Transparency (New York, 2018), 77–91, 
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html; see also Citron, Sexual Privacy, 
supra note; Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, HARV. J. L. & TECH (2015). 
25 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009). 
26 Richards & Hartzog, supra note, at. 
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afforded intimate life. Treating sexual privacy as a consumer protection 
problem underestimates the interests at stake. The surveillance of intimate 
life matters not just because firms fail to provide notice or engage in 
deceptive practices but also because they undermine autonomy, dignity, 
intimacy, and equality. It matters because people’s crucial life 
opportunities, including employment, education, housing, insurance, 
professional certification, and self-expression, are on the line. It matters 
because civil rights and civil liberties hang in the balance. 
 
All personal data needs protection, but even more so for intimate 
information.27 This approach aligns with the well-accepted approach to 
sensitive data that should apply to secure sexual privacy.28 Intimate 
information should not be collected or processed without meaningful 
consent—knowing, voluntary, and express consent. Firms should not use 
personal data to infer intimate information, nor should they use intimate 
information to manipulate people to act against their interests. Firms 
should have obligations of loyalty to the intimate data that they handle. 
Available remedies should include injunctive relief ordering firms to stop 
processing intimate data until legal commitments are satisfied. Repeated 
violations can and should face the data death penalty—forbidding a firm’s 
handling of personal data now and in the future.29 
 
This Article has three parts. Part I provides a snapshot into the corporate 
surveillance of intimate life. It categorizes such surveillance into first-party 
data collection and third-party data collection. Part II highlights the damage 
                                                 
27 There is plenty of terrific scholarship on the contours of strong baseline privacy 
protections. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Consent, 96 WASH. 
U. L. REV. (2019); Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 
MD. L. REV. 952 (2017); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. (2016); Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA 
PROTECTION REV. 423 (2018); Richards & Hartzog, supra note. Cameron Kerry has been 
thoughtfully exploring the various proposals for data privacy reform at the federal level. 
See, e.g., Cameron F. Kerry, Protecting Privacy in an AI-Driven World, Brookings Institute 
(February 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/protecting-privacy-in-an-ai-
driven-world/; Cameron F. Kerry, https://www.lawfareblog.com/data-collection-
standards-privacy-legislation-proposed-language; Cameron F. Kerry, A Federal Privacy 
Law Could Do Better than California’s, L.A. Times (April 25, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kerry-ccpa-data-privacy-laws-
20190425-story.html; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/06/26/why-
data-ownership-is-the-wrong-approach-to-protecting-privacy/;  
28 Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2015); Danielle Keats 
Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the 
Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007). 
29 Thanks to Woodrow Hartzog for suggesting the concept of the data death penalty 
to describe stop processing orders. 
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corporate intimate surveillance causes to the values sexual privacy secures 
and the harm to human well-being it inflicts. It provides an overview of the 
legal landscape and the extent to which law is failing us. Part III offers a 
plan of action for the protection of intimate information. It situates privacy 
as a matter of civil rights and not just consumer protection. It provides 
guideposts for regulating the private sector’s surveillance of intimate 
information. It suggests affirmative obligations for firms in the collection, 
use, and storage of intimate data and the addition of injunctive relief.  
I. UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR SURVEILLANCE OF INTIMATE LIFE 
 
This Part gives us a glimpse of the private sector’s wide-ranging 
surveillance of intimate life.30 First, it describes scenarios of first-party 
collection—by which I mean instances where people have direct 
relationships with businesses collecting their intimate information. Then, it 
gives examples of third-party collection—by which I mean instances where 
people lack a direct relationship with private entities handling their 
intimate information. I use the concepts of first-party and third-party data 
collection to organize the varied commercial scenarios in which intimate 
information is collected, processed, used, and shared. 
 
A. Cataloging First-Party Collection  
 
                                                 
30 Karen Levy has an important symposium piece focusing on surveillance practices in 
the home, often (though not always) involving consensual intimate partners. Karen E.C. 
Levy, Intimate Surveillance, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 679 (2015). In that work, Professor Levy 
helpfully breaks down intimate surveillance into three categories: dating, tracking intimate 
and romantic partners, and fertility monitoring. In this article, I explore the collection, use, 
sharing, and storage of information about all aspects of intimate life, including but not 
limited to the home, building on my work on commercial databases of sensitive 
information, cyber civil rights, nonconsensual pornography, cyber stalking apps, sexual 
privacy, and deep fakes. See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of 
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2006); 
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Danielle Keats Citron & 
Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014); Danielle 
Keats Citron, The Right to Sexual Privacy in VISIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE (Marc 
Rotenberg et al. eds 2015); Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 
(2015); Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870 (2019); Danielle Keats 
Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1189 (2019); Danielle Keats 
Citron & Robert Chesney, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and 
National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753 (2019). I am using first-party and third-party data 
collection as a way to understand the broad array of firms involved in collecting, using, 
sharing, and storing intimate information.  
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Businesses routinely gather intimate information directly from 
individuals. First-party collection includes sites related to sexual and 
reproductive health, porn sites, dating apps, and personal devices. 
 
1. Sexual and Reproductive Health 
 
Countless apps are devoted to the collection of information about sexual 
and reproductive health. Sites and apps let people track their sex lives, 
including when they had sex, with whom, whether they used protection, 
and when they masturbated.31 Some host community forums where 
subscribers can connect with each other to discuss their sex lives.32 Health 
apps increasingly let users track their sexual activity.33  
 
There are male-oriented health companies focusing on sexual issues.34 
For instance, the startup Ro sends erectile dysfunction drugs directly to 
consumers. Hims provides treatments for male hair and sexual issues. 
Those two firms alone raised more than 80 million each in financing.35 
 
The term “femtech” describes apps and services that collect information 
about women’s period cycles, fertility, pregnancies, menopause, and sexual 
and reproductive histories.36 Nearly one third of women in the United 
States use period-tracking apps.37 Menstrual tracking apps are the fourth 
most popular health app among adults and the second most popular 
among girls.38 The startup Gennev provides a “free” online menopause 
                                                 
31 Emma McGowan, Tracking Your Sex Life With Apps Makes It Super Easy, Bustle 
(January 9, 2020), https://www.bustle.com/p/tracking-your-sex-life-with-apps-makes-
it-super-easy-19779217. 
32 Id. 
33 Lux Alptraum, Apple’s Health App Now Tracks Sexual Activity, and That’s a Big 
Opportunity, MOTHERBOARD (October 23, 2016, 1:00 p.m.). 
34 https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/this-year-is-setting-records-for-femtech-
funding. 
35 Id. 
36 Harwell, supra note, at. 
37 Donna Rosatto, What Your Period Tracker App Knows About You, Consumer 
Reports (January 22, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/health-privacy/what-
your-period-tracker-app-knows-about-you/. There are also fertility apps that track 
women’s menstrual cycles and pregnancy apps that monitor women’s habits, mood, fetal 
movements, and more. Quantifying Fertility and Reproduction Through Mobile APPs: A 
Critical Overview, Arrow for Change, vol. 22, at 13-14 (2016). Some apps like Glow cover all 
aspects of fertility, including tracking women’s cycles, fertility, pregnancy, and a baby’s 
development in the first year. Id. 
38 Michelle L. Moglia et al., Evaluation of Smartphone Menstrual Cycle Tracking 
Applications Using an Adapted APPLICATIONS Scoring System, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, 
volume 127 (June 2016). 
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health assessment that “collects 72 data points—and nearly 35,000 women 
took it in 2019.”39 Menopause startups have raised $254 million in the past 
ten years while femtech startups as a whole raised more than $498 million 
in 2019 alone.40 
 
Subscribers of menstrual tracking apps enter, among other things, their 
weight, temperatures, moods, reading material, sexual encounters, tampon 
use, alcohol consumption, cigarette and coffee habits, bodily secretions, and 
birth-control pills.41 Apple’s Health app syncs with period and fertility 
tracking apps and allows subscribers to track their sexual activity.42 The Flo 
app provides extra features such as period predictions and health reports 
that can be shared with doctors.43 Some services let subscribers obtain 
discounts on products like tampons.44 
 
Consider the Eve Glow app. Subscribers must record their sex drive 
status with the following choices: “DO ME NOW, I’m down, or MIA.”45 To 
complete their health log, subscribers must input whether they orgasmed 
during sex.46 The app’s screen enables subscribers to answer “YASSS, No, 
                                                 
39 Eliza Haverstrock, Narrative change: VCs are finally ready to talk about 
menopause, PitchBook (May 28, 2020), available at 
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/vc-menopause-femtech 
40 https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/vc-menopause-femtech. 
41 Privacy International, No Body’s Business But Mine: How Menstruation Apps Are 
Sharing Your Data (Sept. 9, 2019) https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3196/no-
bodys-business-mine-how-menstruation-apps-are-sharing-your-data. For instance, the 
app Clue goes further and asks subscribers to track not just the dates and details of their 
menstrual cycles but also their discharge of cervical fluids, medication, sex life, injections, 
illnesses, and cervical position. Sadaf Khan, Data Bleeding Everywhere: A Story of Period 
Trackers, MEDIUM (June 7, 2019), https://deepdives.in/data-bleeding-everywhere-a-story-
of-period-trackers-8766dc6a1e00. The Ovia app lets users indicate the consistency of their 
cervical discharge, from egg whites and water to a bottle of school glue. Id. As Karen Levy 
has noted, period-tracking apps are also marketed to people’s partners so that they can 
manage their relationships around menstrual cycles. Karen Levy, Intimate Surveillance, 51 
IDAHO L. REV. 679, 685-86 (2015) (discussing apps like PMSTracker and iAmAMan, which 
enables subscribers to track multiple women’s cycles and uses multiple passwords to allow 
users to conceal their tracking activity). 
42 Lux Alptraum, Apple’s Health App Now Tracks Sexual Activity, and That’s a Big 
Opportunity, MOTHERBOARD (October 23, 2016). Some apps are exclusively designed to 
track people’s sexual activity. On Bedpost’s app, subscribers track the names of sexual 
partners, dates of sexual experiences, and rank the sexual experience. 
http://www.bedposted.com/ 
43 Id. 
44 Rosatto, supra note, at. 
45 MIA presumably means “Missing In Action.” 
46 Sadaf Khan, Data Bleeding Everywhere: A Story of Period Trackers, MEDIUM (June 7, 
2019), https://deepdives.in/data-bleeding-everywhere-a-story-of-period-trackers-
8766dc6a1e00. 
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or Faked It.”47 They are asked to indicate whether they are experiencing 
cramps, tender breasts, or bloating.48  
 
Femtech apps like Eve Glow host discussion boards where people using 
the services talk to each other about their intimate lives, including their 
experiences with sex, fertility, abortions, or miscarriages.  A user of Eve 
Glow explained that she “kind of lose[s] [her] inhibition because so many 
other women are talking” about their intimate lives on the discussion 
boards.49 The apps track and store those communications. 
 
Three million people use Glow’s suite of apps, which include Eve Glow, 
Glow, Glow Nurture, and Glow Baby.50 The company is part of HVF Labs 
whose objective is to “take advantage of potential low-cost sensors, the 
gradual increase in access to broadband, and the high storage capacity to 
collect and explore ‘data as a commodity.’”51 Glow’s privacy policy says that 
the company may decide to share information collected on the app with 
third parties to inform users about goods and services including those 
conducting medical research. Only some of the user data shared is “made 
anonymous.”52    
 
Businesses pair health devices with apps to track individuals’ intimate 
data. Looncup, for instance, is poised to offer a smart menstrual cup that 
records the volume and color of menstrual fluid on its app, ostensibly for 
health benefits.53 Trackle links a vaginal thermometer with an app 
measuring women’s inner temperature.54 
 
Reproductive health apps market themselves as providing expert 
advice. Yet many are riddled with misinformation. According to 
researchers, free menstrual cycle tracking apps are riddled with inaccurate 
information.55 Most the apps were “inaccurate, contain misleading health 
information, or do not function.” Only 20 percent of the period-tracking 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Khan, supra note, at. 
49 Id. 
50 Natasha Felizi & Joana Varon, Menstruapps—How to Tur Your Period Into Money (For 
Others), CHUPADOS (CODING RIGHTS) (emphasis added). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/700989404/looncup-the-worlds-first-
smart-menstrual-cup. Looncup is now available for pre-order. 
http://www.looncup.com/. 
54 Quantifying Fertility and Reproduction Through Mobile APPs: A Critical Overview, 
ARROW FOR CHANGE, vol. 22, at 13-14 (2016). 
55 Moglia, supra note, at 1157. 
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apps predicted periods accurately and even those apps contained 
erroneous medical information.56 
 
Femtech apps also have been prone to security problems. In 2016, 
Consumer Reports found that anyone could access Glow subscribers’ 
health data, including the dates of abortions and sexual encounters, if they 
had their email addresses.57 Flo was caught sending Facebook subscribers’ 
information including when they were trying to conceive and having their 
periods.58 
 
2. Porn Sites 
 
Pornography sites collect and store a wealth of information about 
people’s sexual interests, desires, and sexual practices. They derive intimate 
information from people’s search queries, the time and frequency of their 
visits, and private chats. The most popular free porn site PornHub reports 
that the most searched terms on the site include lesbian, “milf,” stepmom, 
and teen.59 The very nature of some porn sites reveals people’s sexual 
interests like bestiality or incest sites.  
 
Some specialty sites require members to provide email addresses, 
passwords, and credit card information.60 A zoophilia forum accumulated 
personal information for about 71,000 individuals, including usernames, 
birth dates, and IP addresses.61 Rosebuttboard.com, a forum dedicated to 
                                                 
56 Id. 
       57 Jerry Beilinson, Glow Pregnancy App Exposed Women to Privacy Threats, Consumer 
Reports Finds, CONSUMER REPORTS (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancy-app-
exposed-women-to-privacy-threats/ 
58 https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-give-apps-sensitive-personal-information-
then-they-tell-facebook-11550851636?mod=e2tw 
      59 The 2019 Year in Review, PORNHUB INSIGHTS (Dec. 11, 2019), 
https://www.pornhub.com/insights/2019-year-in-review#searches; 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/all-about-sex/201803/surprising-new-
data-the-world-s-most-popular-porn-site. 
60 Joseph Cox, Thousands of Bestiality Website Users Exposed in Hack, MOTHERBOARD 
(March 29, 2018), available at https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/evqvpz/bestiality-
website-hacked-troy-hunt-have-i-been-pwned (explaining that hack of bestiality site 
revealed more than 3,000 users’ full names, password hashes, birthdates, IP addresses, and 
a “few hundred private messages between users”). 
61 Have I Been Pwned (@haveibeenpwned), TWITTER (Oct. 19, 2019, 5:25 PM), 
https://twitter.com/haveibeenpwned/status/1185668262538838016. Hackers exposed 
the personal details of the users of the bestiality site online. Ahmed Waqas, Animal abuse 
website hacked; thousands of users exposed, HACKREAD (March 30, 2018), 
https://www.hackread.com/animal-abuse-website-hacked-users-exposed/. 
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“extreme anal dilation and anal fisting,” recorded the personal information 
of 100,000 user accounts, including the email addresses of military members 
and federal employees.62  
 
Porn sites are some of the most popular sites online. They garner more 
visitors a month than Amazon, Netflix, and Twitter combined.63 In 2018, 
PornHub had 33.5 billion visits.64 It had an average of 63,000 visitors per 
minute.65 In 2019, that number grew to 80,000 visitors per minute.66 
 
3. Dating Apps 
 
Dating apps and services collect broad swaths of people’s intimate 
(paired with personally identifying) information, including name, 
photograph, occupation, location, relationship status, romantic or sexual 
interests, sexual orientation, interest in extramarital affairs, or sexually 
transmitted infections.67 Adults are not the only ones on dating apps; many 
teenagers also subscribe to Tinder, MeetMe, Hot or Not, MyLOL, and Kik.68 
                                                 
62 Joseph Cox, Another Day, Another Hack: Is Your Fisting Site Updating Its Forum 
Software?, VICE (May 10, 2016, 9:54 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qkjj4p/rosebuttboard-ip-board;  Jonathan Keane, 
Hack shows government and military employees used their email addresses on hardcore fetish site, 
DIGITAL TRENDS (May 13, 2016, 12:11 PM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/rosebutt-hack/;  Troy Hunt (@troyhunt), 
TWITTER (May 10, 2016, 10:06 AM), 
https://twitter.com/troyhunt/status/730036184651431937. 
63 Elena Maris, Timothy Libert & Jennifer Henrichsen, Tracking Sex: The Implications of 
Widespread Sexual Data Leakage and Tracking on Porn Websites, NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY (July 
2019). 
64 Digital Fingerprints: How the Porn You Watch May Be Watching You (Feb. 13, 2019). 
65 https://fightthenewdrug.org/pornhub-visitors-in-2018-and-review-of-top-
searches/. 
66 The 2019 Year in Review, PORNHUB INSIGHTS (Dec. 11, 2019), 
https://www.pornhub.com/insights/2019-year-in-review.  
67 See Thomas Germain, How Private is Your Online Dating Data?, CONSUMER REPORTS 
(Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/how-private-is-your-online-
dating-data/ (“You might never choose to share those thousands of intimate facts with a 
friend or family member, but if you use dating apps, you are providing the information to 
companies that will collect and retain every detail.”); see also Michael Zimmer, OKCupid 
Study Reveals the Perils of Big-Data Science, WIRED (May 14, 2016 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/05/okcupid-study-reveals-perils-big-data-science/. It is 
worth noting the rise of dating intelligence apps like Lulu that allow women to 
anonymously review and rate men. Lulu raised $6 million in venture funding and was 
acquired by Badoo in 2016. https://pitchbook.com/newsletter/dating-intelligence-app-
lulu-acquired-by-badoo. 
68 Christina Elgersma, Tinder and 7 More Dating Apps Teens Are Using, COMMON SENSE 
MEDIA BLOG (February 12, 2019), avalaible at 
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Such sites are commonly used by LGBTQ youth who lack supportive 
networks at school to use dating apps to connect with others.69 
 
Simple behaviors on these apps and sites, such as how long a user views 
a particular profile or image, can reveal the characteristics or features that 
a person looks for in a romantic partner.70 Journalist Judith Duportail 
discovered just how extensive her disclosures to Tinder were when her 
GPDR request to the company returned 800 pages of detailed information.71 
A review of the 1,700 messages Duportail sent through the app revealed her 
“hopes, fears, sexual preferences and deepest secrets.”72 
 
All of this intimate information is ripe for exploitation and disclosure.73 
In some cases, this data may appear in the profiles of potential matches.74 
As explored below, it may be shared with advertisers and other firms. It 
may be inadequately secured and stolen by thieves. Hackers have targeted 
individual accounts and dating services to steal intimate information in 
order to blackmail and extort subscribers.75 In 2015, a data breach resulted 
                                                 
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/blog/tinder-and-7-more-dating-apps-teens-are-
using. Teenagers can access some of these apps via Facebook. Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Germain, supra note. 
71 The documents included Duportail’s Facebook likes and number of friends, links to 
her Instagram photos, her education, the age-range of men she was interested in, the 
number of times she opened the app, the number of people she matched with, and where 
and when each conversation with a match took place. Judith Duportail, I asked Tinder for 
my data. It sent me 800 pages of my deepest, darkest secrets, GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2017, 2:10 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/26/tinder-personal-data-dating-
app-messages-hacked-sold. Facebook started a dating app in 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/opinion/facebook-dating-app.html; 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/facebook-dating/. 
72 Duportail, supra note. 
73 “Tinder’s privacy policy clearly states: ‘you should not expect that your personal 
information, chats, or other communications will always remain secure.’” Duportail, supra 
note; see also Privacy Policy, TINDER, https://www.gotinder.com/privacy (last updated 
May 2, 2018) (“As with all technology companies, although we take steps to secure your 
information, we do not promise, and you should not expect, that your personal 
information will always remain secure.”). 
74 In 2016, Danish researchers refused to anonymize a data set containing 70,000 OK 
Cupid users’ “usernames, age, gender, location, what kind of relationship (or sex) they’re 
interested in, personality traits, and answers to thousands of profiling questions.” Zimmer, 
supra note. The researchers argued that the information was already “publicly available,” 
though Zimmer notes that this is not entirely accurate. Id. “Since OkCupid users have the 
option to restrict the visibility of their profiles to logged-in users only, it is likely the 
researchers collected—and subsequently released—profiles that were intended to not be 
publicly viewable.” Id. 
75 Lily Hay Newman, Hacks, Nudes, and Breaches: It's Been a Rough Month for Dating 
Apps, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/ok-cupid-dating-
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in hackers publishing online the personal details of subscribers to Ashley 
Madison, a site for people seeking extra-marital affairs.76 Millions of 
subscribers’ names, emails, sexual preferences, and sexual desires were 
posted online in a searchable format. To this day, criminals have been using 
the intimate information shared with Ashley Madison in extortion 
schemes.77 
 
With respect to particular sites, membership or browsing on the site may 
reveal someone’s sexual preferences and indiscretions.78 In October 2016, 
hackers obtained 412 million account records from Friend Finder 
Networks.79 The information exposed included “email addresses, 
passwords, dates of last visits, browser information, IP addresses and site 
membership status across sites run by Friend Finder Networks,” including 
Adult Friend Finder, Cams.com, Penthouse.com, and three other sites.80 
                                                 
apps-hacks-breaches-security/. “The same factors that make dating sites an appealing 
target for hackers also make them useful for romance scams: It's easier to assess and 
approach people on a site that are already meant for sharing information with strangers.” 
Id. 
76 Zak Doffman, Ashley Madison Hack Returns To ‘Haunt’ Its Victims; 32 Million Users 
Now Watch and Wait, MEDIUM (Feb. 1, 2020) (explaining that the Ashley Madison hack 
resulted in the leaking of intimate information of 32 million people). Ashley Madison 
touted its service as enabling “infidelity and married dating.” Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally 
Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-
data/. The data released by hackers included names, passwords, addresses, phone 
numbers submitted by users of the site. Id. Also included were users’ credit card 
transactions, revealing people’s real names and addresses. Id. The data dump revealed 
members’ sexual fantasies and desires, such as “I like lots of foreplay and stamina, fun, 
discretion, oral, even willingness to experiment.” Id. As Karen Levy wisely noted, “the real 
benefit of self-tracking is always to the company. People are being asked to do this at a 
time when they’re incredibly vulnerable and may not have any sense where that data is 
being passed.” Id. Nor do they realize how easy it is to re-identify such information. 
77 Zak Doffman, Ashley Madison Hack Returns To ‘Haunt’ Its Victims; 32 Million Users 
Now Watch and Wait, MEDIUM (Feb. 1, 2020) (explaining that victims of Ashley Madison 
hack are receiving emails with embarrassing details from the breach, such as that a victim 
shared that they received “’chemical help’ for a good time or private messages sent to other 
site members, and with demands for bitcoin ransom to be paid in a limited amount of 
time). 
78 See, e.g., Cox, supra note; Broder Van Dyke, infra note. 
79 “Among the leaked account details were 78,301 US military email addresses, 5,650 
US government email addresses and over 96[ million] Hotmail accounts. . . . [A]lso 
included the details of what appear to be almost 16[ million] deleted accounts.” Samuel 
Gibbs, Adult Friend Finder and Penthouse hacked in massive personal data breach, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 14, 2016, 6:21 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/14/adult-friend-finder-and-
penthouse-hacked-in-largest-personal-data-breach-on-record.  
80 “This is not the first time Adult Friend Network has been hacked. In May 2015 the 
personal details of almost four million users were leaked by hackers, including their login 
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Three years later, a hacker obtained 250,000 “email addresses, usernames, 
IP addresses, and hashed passwords” from Dutch sex-work forum 
Hookers.nl where “clients discuss[ed] their experiences with sex 
workers.”81  
 
4. Personal Devices 
 
An array of devices records people’s intimate activities and interactions. 
Sex toys are obvious examples. We-Vibe, a networked vibrator, allows 
subscribers to control others’ devices via an app. The app let partners to 
communicate with each other via text or video chat.82 The Lioness vibrator 
similarly enables subscribers to live stream “what is going on in the 
moment” and permits partners to remotely control the device.83 Companies 
sell wi-fi enabled butt plugs, vibrating masturbators for men, and devices 
for the penis that track thrusting.84 Like many consumer goods, internet-
connected sex toys are not developed with privacy and security in mind.85 
                                                 
details, emails, dates of birth, post codes, sexual preferences and whether they were 
seeking extramarital affairs.” Gibbs, supra note. The inclusion of data from Penthouse.com 
in the 2016 breach was particularly concerning as Friend Finder Networks sold the site to 
Penthouse Global Media in February 2016. 
81 Samantha Cole & Joseph Cox, A Hacker Stole 250k User Account Details from a Dutch 
Sex Work Site, VICE (Oct. 10, 2019, 10:32 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d3a5gy/hacker-stole-user-account-details-from-
a-dutch-sex-work-site-hookers-nl (“Although prostitution is legal and regulated in the 
Netherlands, people still seek anonymity when they're buying services—whether from 
websites like Hookers.nl or in person at brothels.”); Thomas Brewster, Dutch Prostitution 
Site Hookers.nl Hacked—250,000 Users’ Data Leaked, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2019, 8:43 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2019/10/10/dutch-prostitution-site-
hookersnl-hacked--250000-users-data-leaked/(“Dutch broadcaster NOS, which broke the 
story. . . viewed some of the data and said it could determine some real names of users”) 
82 Steven Musil, Internet-connected vibrator connects with privacy lawsuit, CNET (Sept. 13, 
2016, 4:15 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/internet-connected-vibrator-we-vibe-
lawsuit-privacy-data/.  
83 https://blog.lioness.io/now-you-can-see-your-orgasm-in-real-time-359afbdfa6d0. 
We-Vibe recorded the dates and times of a vibrator’s use and the intensity and mode 
selected by subscribers without their consent, leading to a class action lawsuit discussed in 
Part II. See Amended Complaint, N.P & P.S. v. Standard Innovation Corp., Case No. 16-
CV-08655 (N.D. Ill. Filed February 27, 2017). 
84 Emily Dreyfuss, Don’t Get Your Valentine an Internet-Connected Sex Toy, WIRED 
(February 14, 2019); https://jezebel.com/how-fit-is-your-dick-exactly-the-sexfit-ring-
knows-al-1618065007. 
85 Internet of Dongs, Goals, available at https://internetofdon.gs/about/. Security 
researchers involved in “The Internet of Dongs Project” report on security vulnerabilities 
and work with companies interested in fixing problems. The researchers have published 
guidance documents on the reporting of security vulnerabilities and ensuring secure 
software development lifecycle to prevent vulnerabilities from occurring in the first place. 
https://internetofdon.gs/vendor-resources/. 
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While voice-enabled personal assistants that listen to and record 
people’s activities are less obviously related to intimate life, they are no less 
important.86 Amazon’s Echo and other Alexa-enabled devices are marketed 
as in-home hubs for managing day-to-day tasks. They record people’s 
communications, storing them as voice recordings and text transcripts in 
the cloud.87 Amazon retains text transcripts even after subscribers choose 
to delete the saved audio files of their voice interactions with the device.88  
 
According to researchers, voice-activated assistants like Alexa and Echo 
do not only wake and record when subscribers say the wake word. The 
systems are error-prone and have recorded intimate conversations.89 
Apple’s Siri has captured recordings of sexual encounters.90 Computer 
science researchers at Northeastern University conducted a study of smart 
speakers by exposing devices to three audiobooks and nine episodes of the 
television show The Gilmore Girls.91 There were 63 false positives in 21 
hours.92  
 
Amazon employs thousands of people worldwide to analyze and 
transcribe voice clips to improve Alexa’s accuracy.93 Some employees have 
watched people’s home camera footage.94 One German Amazon customer 
inadvertently received hundreds of Alexa recordings and transcripts from 
                                                 
86 Alex Hern, Apple contractors ‘regularly hear confidential details’ on Siri recordings, 
GUARDIAN (July 2019, 2019 12:34 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-
hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings.  
87 Makena Kelly & Nick Statt, Amazon confirms it holds on to Alexa data even if you delete 
audio files, VERGE (July 3, 2019, 4:14 p.m. EDT), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/3/20681423/amazon-alexa-echo-chris-coons-data-
transcripts-recording-privacy. 
88 Id. 
89 Allen St. John, Smart Speakers that Listen When They Shouldn’t (August 29, 2019); Alex 
Hern, Apple contractors ‘regularly hear confidential details’ on Siri recordings, GUARDIAN (July 
2019, 2019 12:34 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-
contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Matt Day, Giles Turner & Natalia Drozdiak, Amazon Workers Are Listening to What 
You Tell Alexa, BLOOMBERG (April 10, 2019, 6:34 PM EDT), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/is-anyone-listening-to-you-on-
alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio. 
94 Natalia Drozdiak et al., Amazon Workers May Be Watching Your Cloud Cam Home 
Footage, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2019 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-10/is-amazon-watching-you-
cloud-cam-footage-reviewed-by-humans. 
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another user in response to a GDPR request in August 2018.95 The person 
could be heard in multiple locations, including the shower, as could a 
frequent female guest.96 A German magazine found it “fairly easy to 
identify the person involved and his female companion” using “[w]eather 
queries, first names, and even someone’s last name.”97 In July 2019, Google 
admitted to a similar breach after a contractor shared with a news site more 
than 1,000 sound recordings of customer conversations made by Google 
Assistant.98 Included in the recordings were people talking about medical 
conditions.99  
 
Amazon plans to expand Alexa’s reach, with one executive telling The 
New York Times, “there is no reason not to put them everywhere in your 
house.”100 Amazon has released a tiny version of the device, Echo Flex, 
meant for bathrooms, which plugs into wall outlets.101 Customized, 
location-specific versions of Alexa are being sold and deployed in hotel 
rooms around the country.102 
 
B. Surveying Third-Party Collection  
 
                                                 
95 Jennings Brown, The Amazon Alexa Eavesdropping Nightmare Came True, GIZMODO 
(Dec. 20, 2018, 11:24 AM), https://gizmodo.com/the-amazon-alexa-eavesdropping-
nightmare-came-true-1831231490. Amazon later claimed this occurred because of a “one-
time error” by a staff member and disabled the link that provided access to the data. Id.  
96 Brown, supra note. 
97 Brown, supra note. 
98 Todd Hasleton, Google admits partners leaked more than 1,000 private conversations with 
Google Assistant, CNBC (July 11, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/11/google-
admits-leaked-private-voice-conversations.html. 
99 Hasleton, supra note. 
100 Weise, supra note, at. Kohler took Amazon’s advice to heart, announcing a version 
of its Moxie showerhead that includes a removable Alexa-enabled speaker imbedded right 
in the showerhead itself. Chris Davies, Kohler put Alexa in your showerhead and gave your 
toilet an app, SLASHGEAR (Jan. 3, 2020, 11:48 AM), https://www.slashgear.com/kohler-put-
alexa-in-your-showerhead-and-gave-your-toilet-an-app-03605166/. 
101 Karen Weise, Amazon Wants Alexa to Move (With You) Far Beyond the Living Room, 
NEW YORK TIMES (September 25, 2019).  
102 Chris Welch, Amazon made a special version of Alexa for hotels with Echo speakers in their 
rooms, VERGE (June 19, 2018 6:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/19/17476688/amazon-alexa-for-hospitality-
announced-hotels-echo. In 2019, to my surprise, I found an Alexa in my hotel room at the 
Oklahoma City Ambassador hotel. A card under the black unassuming device said, “Need 
something? Just Ask Alexa.” It continued, “Ready for Bed?” tell Alexa to “play white 
noise.” The device enabled live connections to the front desk, room service, and 
housekeeping. I went to the front desk to complain because the room did not otherwise 
have a phone. The attendant explained that I was the first person to object to the device 
and that most guests did not mention even noticing it. 
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First-party collection is often tied to third-party collection. Sometimes, 
companies purchase intimate data from first-party collectors. At other 
times, they obtain intimate information from someone who lack authority 
to share, disclose, or sell it. This section provides illustrations. 
 
1. The Data Hand-Off: Advertising and Analytics 
 
First-party data collectors often allow advertising firms to collect 
subscribers’ intimate information for a fee. Period-tracking apps share user 
data with online advertisers who may further resell the information.103 For 
instance, Maya and MIA Fem share data about subscribers’ contraception 
and sexual encounters with Facebook’s advertising system (even if those 
individuals do not have Facebook accounts themselves).104 Although the 
apps are marketed to consumers as “free,” their price is people’s most 
intimate information.105 
 
First-party data collectors allow analytics firms to place trackers on their 
sites. For instance, Grindr shared subscribers’ HIV status (noted as positive, 
positive on HIV treatment, negative, or negative on PrEP) with two 
companies hired to optimize the app.106 It also disclosed to advertisers 
                                                 
103 At least 11 apps sent Facebook intimate information even though some of the app 
subscribers were not Facebook members at all and those who used Facebook were not 
logged into the site. Daniel Moritz Rabson, Does Facebook Collect Your ‘Intimate Secrets’ From 
Apps? Gov. Andrew Cuomo orders Investigation, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 22 2019, 3:58 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/new-york-governor-directs-investigation-facebook-
information-collection-1341170. Facebook claimed the apps sharing information with it 
violated its terms of service. Apps send intimate user data to Facebook: Report, HINDU (Feb. 23, 
2019, 9:52 PM), https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/apps-send-intimate-
user-data-to-facebook-report/article26352817.ece 
104 Marie C. Baca, These apps may have told Facebook about the last time you had sex, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 17, 2019, 3:21 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/10/these-apps-may-have-told-
facebook-about-last-time-you-had-sex/. For instance, users tried to block tracking by 
using anonymizing browsers. 
105 Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note, at.  
106 Azeen Ghorayshi & Sri Ray, Grindr Is Letting Other Companies See User HIV Status 
and Location Data, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 2, 2018, 11:13 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/azeenghorayshi/grindr-hiv-status-
privacy. Grindr defended its sharing with the analytics companies, Apptimize and 
Localitics, as essential to making the app better. Id. Localytics describes its services as 
combining people’s profile data (who they are) and behavioral data (how they behave 
online) to personalize mobile advertising. Localytics, The Stages of Personalization, 
available at https://ebooks.localytics.com/the-stages-of-personalization#the-stages-of-
personalization-1. Profile data, the company explains, can originate from many sources. 
More than 37,000 apps use the service. Id. In response to bad press and pushback from 
subscribers, Grindr announced that it would stop sharing HIV status information with 
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subscribers’ “tribe” (meaning what gay subculture they identify with), 
precise geolocation, sexuality, relationship status, and phone ID.107 Some of 
the information shared with advertisers appeared in plain text.108 
 
Third-party trackers are pervasive on porn sites. Researchers found that 
93 percent of 22,484 porn sites analyzed allowed third parties to collect 
information about people’s browsing habits, even where viewers took steps 
to hide them.109 On average, porn sties had seven companies tracking 
viewers’ information. Google trackers appeared on 50 percent of the sites 
studied, Oracle on 24 percent, and Facebook on ten percent.110 Porn-specific 
trackers included ExoClick, JuicyAds, and EroAdvertising.111 Another 2019 
study found that more half of the top 100 most popular porn sites host third-
party trackers that use a technique allowing cookies to be synchronized 
across sites.112 Microsoft’s Elena Maris noted that, “The fact that the 
mechanism for adult site tracking is so similar to, say, online retail should 
be a huge red flag.”113 
 
Third-party trackers collected people’s IP addresses, phone’s 
advertising identification number, and information suggesting their sexual 
desires.114 Forty-five percent of porn site URLs include words or phrases 
                                                 
third parties. Azeen Ghorayshi, Grindr Will Stop Sharing Users' HIV Data with Other 
Companies, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 2, 2018, 11:03 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/azeenghorayshi/grindr-stopped-sharing-hiv-
status.  
107 Ghorayshi & Ray, supra note. In late 2019, Norwegian researchers found that Grindr 
uses various advertising networks and some received information about the type of 
relationship the user is looking for. Norwegian Consumer Council, Out of Control—A 
Review of Data Sharing By Popular Mobile Apps 30, available at 
https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/mnemonic-security-test-
report-v1.0.pdf 
108 Id. Grindr’s privacy policy states that if subscribers “choose to include information 
in your profile, and make your profile public, that information will also become public.” 
Id.  
109 Elena Maris, Timothy Libert & Jennifer Henrichsen, Tracking Sex: The Implications of 
Widespread Sexual Data Leakage and Tracking on Porn Websites (July 2019). 
110 Id. After the study was released, Google denied its software was collecting 
information to build advertising profiles. James Vincent, Google and Facebook’s Tracking 
Software Is Widely Used on Porn Sites, Shows New Study, THE VERGE (July 18, 2019). The 
company also claimed that tags for ad services are never allowed to transmit personally 
identifiable information. Id. 
111 Id. at 5. 
112 Pelayo Vallina et al., Tales from the Porn: A Comprehensive Privacy Analysis of the Web 
Porn Ecosystem, available at 
http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~narseo/papers/pornweb2019_preprint.pdf. 
113 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/google-facebook-sex-websites.html 
114 Id. This is a noted change in practice for the most trafficked porn sites, those owned 
by Pornhub. In 2013, Pornhub’s Vice President said that the Pornhub network, including 
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suggesting a particular sexual preference or interest, such as 
“boyfuckmomtube.” Adult advertising networks collect IP addresses, 
browsers, locations, basic PC details, and other information including how 
much time people spend on certain videos and what categories of porn they 
select.115  
 
2. Data Brokers 
 
Data brokers amass and sell dossiers with thousands of data points on 
every person, categorizing them based on intimate information. Their 
dossiers pair basic information like names, addresses, employers, and 
contact information, with far more sensitive material. They detail people’s 
sexual preferences, porn consumption, sex toy purchases, escort service 
usage, and reproductive choices.116 People are tagged as rape victims, 
Erectile Dysfunction sufferers, sex toy purchasers, AIDS/HIV infected, and 
gay air force personnel.117 
 
Data brokers sell lists of gay and lesbian adults, rape victims, people 
with sexual addictions, individuals with sexually transmitted diseases, 
purchasers of adult material and sex toys.118 Some data brokers specialize 
in dating profiles. For instance, USDate sells dating profiles that include 
people’s photographs, usernames, email addresses, nationality, gender, 
and sexual orientation.119 Exact Data sells customer lists of adult dating 
service subscribers, dating and escort services, and “Suddenly single.”120 
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The data-broker industry generates 200 billion dollars annually.121 
People’s personal information is harvested from a vast array of sources, 
including government records, advertisers, and analytics firms, largely 
without individuals’ knowledge.122 Thousands of data brokers operate in 
the United States.123 Data brokers have personal information on 95 percent 
of the U.S. population.124  
 
Data brokers say that their dossiers enhance online advertising and 
email marketing campaigns.125 They offer their services as “people search 
sites” to anyone interested in finding out about specific individuals.126 They 
also sell risk mitigation products described as helping clients prevent fraud 
that can adversely impact people’s ability to obtain certain benefits.127 
Clients include alternative payment providers, educational institutions, 
insurance companies, lenders, political campaigns, pharmaceutical 
companies, technology firms, and real estate services.128 Customers also 
include government agencies and law enforcement.129 As Chris Hoofnagle 
put it years ago, data brokers serve as “Big Brother’s Little Helpers.”130  
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3. Cyber Stalking Apps 
 
One infamous sector of the surveillance economy involves the provision 
of spyware, a type of malware installed on someone’s device without 
knowledge or consent. Cyber stalking apps enable continuous real-time 
monitoring of everything phone owners do and say with their devices.131 
In real time, people (often domestic abusers or suspicious partners) can 
track a phone owner’s calls, texts, medical appointments, online searches, 
porn watching, and minute-to-minute movements. Targeted phones can be 
turned into bugging devices, recording conversations within a fifteen-foot 
radius.132 
 
A selling point of cyber stalking apps is their secretive nature. App 
developers assure subscribers that once they download the app to an 
unsuspecting person’s phone, the phone owner will not be able to detect 
the spyware.133 The goal is the stealth surveillance of intimates or ex-
intimates.134 Firms are trying to conceal this fact by taking innocuous 
names. For instance, an app developer changed the name of its app from 
Girlfriend Call Tracker to Family Locator but the service remains the 
same.135 The Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Eva Galperin has been 
watching the industry closely and she explains that the “people who end 
up with this software on their phones can become victims of physical abuse, 
of physical stalking. They get beaten. They can be killed. Their children can 
be kidnapped.”136  
 
4. Purveyors of Nonconsensual (Sometimes Fake) Porn  
 
Invasions of sexual privacy are the business of countless sites. Many 
traffic in nonconsensual pornography—sexually-explicit images disclosed 
without subjects’ consent. Sites solicit users to post people’s nude photos 
and contact information.137 Some are devoted to gay men and others to 
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women.138 Sites earn revenue from online advertising, profiting directly 
from their trade in human misery.139  
 
Online hubs hosting nonconsensual pornography are plentiful.140 More 
than 3,000 porn sites feature revenge porn as a genre.141 Sites have emerged 
soliciting users to post deep-fake sex videos.142 Much like revenge porn 
sites, the business model of these sites is also online advertising, and it is 
lucrative. As the founder of the group Battling Against Demeaning & 
Abusive Selfie Sharing (BADASS) Katlyn Bowden explains, sites hosting 
nonconsensual pornography have grown crueler in their practices.143 
Instead of considering victims’ requests to remove their nude images, the 
most popular sites move the images behind a paywall.144  
 
In a variation on this theme, software developers are selling apps that 
allow subscribers to upload photographs of women and see them nude. The 
app bills itself as artificial intelligence that “undresses photos of women 
and produce[s] a realistic nude image.”145 Services charge a flat fee for 
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premium version. One start-up claims to have what it calls porn-social 
media matching software, which uses facial recognition software to cross 
references faces in pornography videos and people’s social media profiles. 
The business’ stated goal is to “help others check whether their girlfriends 
ever acted in those films.” 
II. ASSESSING THE DAMAGE AND LAW’S RESPONSE 
 
The private sector’s vast reservoirs of intimate information threaten 
crucial values secured by sexual privacy, and they risk damage to human 
well-being. This Part takes stock of the fallout. Then, it explores existing 
legal protections. 
 
A. Undermining the Values Secured by Sexual Privacy 
 
Sexual privacy allows people to manage the boundaries around their 
intimate lives. 146 With sexual privacy, people enjoy the freedom to go 
“backstage” to experiment with their bodies, sexuality, and gender.147 They 
decide who learns about their innermost fantasies, sexual history, and 
sexual and reproductive health. 
 
The private sector’s handling of intimate data undermines the values 
that sexual privacy secures. Firms have jeopardized the autonomy that 
sexual privacy enables. The dating app Jack’d endangered individuals’ 
choice to keep their nude photos private by making it easy for strangers to 
find them online. Grindr negated subscribers’ choice to share intimate 
information only with potential partners by giving it to advertisers and 
analytics. There is every reason to believe that subscribers were distressed 
(to say the least) by the denial of their autonomy.  
 
Private-sector surveillance of intimate information also imperils self-
expression and the ability of people to explore new information and 
ideas.148 The social conformity theory of chilling effects helps explain 
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why.149 People may refrain from searching, browsing, and expressing 
themselves if they perceive their expression and exploration as falling 
outside the mainstream.150 For fear that intimate information will be 
collected and shared in unwanted ways, people will stop visiting sites 
devoted to gender, sexuality, or sexual health. They will not use period-
tracking apps that might help them manage anxiety, pain, and 
uncertainty.151 They will stop visiting adult sites that enable “vicarious 
expression and satisfaction of minority interests that are difficult, 
embarrassing, and occasionally illegal to indulge in reality.”152 They might 
avoid communicating about intimate matters for fear of unwanted 
exposure.153 The self-censorship can be more subtle though no less 
significant. As Jonathon Penney explains, chilling can be more subtle—we 
may see people change engagement and expression to more socially 
conforming, mainstream ones rather than experimental, nonmainstream 
ones.154 
 
Public health officials feared this kind of chilling effect after news broke 
that Grindr had shared its customers’ HIV status with analytics firms.155 A 
Grindr subscriber told Vox that he removed his HIV status from his profile 
after learning about the disclosure. He explained that, “Some people’s jobs 
may be in jeopardy if the wrong people find out about their status—or 
maybe they have difficult family situations. It can put people in danger, and 
it feels like an invasion of privacy.”156 This example is consistent with 
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studies showing that victims of nonconsensual pornography tend to 
withdraw from online engagement and expression.157  
 
The loss of sexual privacy undermines human dignity by changing self-
perception. When people realize their intimate life is being observed, 
tracked, and trafficked, they view themselves as “something seen through 
another’s eyes.”158 As Anita Allen explains, privacy invasions risk 
“form[ing] humiliating, despicable pictures of their victims that interfere 
with their victims’ self-concepts and self-esteem, making them doubt they 
are the people they have worked to be.”159 The loss of sexual privacy also 
undermines dignity by having others see people as just parts of their 
intimate lives and not as fully integrated human beings.160  
 
When people’s nude photos are posted online without consent, they see 
themselves as just their genitals or breasts and fear that others will see them 
that way. For example, in 2018, a young lawyer stayed in a hotel for work.161 
Without her knowledge or permission, a hotel employee placed a camera 
in the bathroom and recorded her as she showered.162 The employee posted 
the video and her personal details on various porn sites.163 The woman told 
me that after finding out about the postings, she despaired at seeing herself 
and at being seen as just a naked body relieving and washing herself.164  
 
Private-sector handling of intimate information can jeopardize the trust 
that is essential for the development of intimate relationships. As Charles 
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Fried argued years ago, privacy is the oxygen for intimacy.165 Intimacy 
develops as partners share vulnerable aspects of themselves.166 Partners 
must believe that their confidences will be kept not only by their partners 
but also by the firms handling their intimate information. If people lose 
faith in the companies facilitating their intimate interactions, then they will 
stop using their services, to the detriment of the project of intimacy. The 
loss of trust is profound when sites disclose people’s nude images without 
consent. People stop dating for fear that future partners will frequent 
revenge porn sites and porn sites to post their nude photos in violation of 
their trust and confidence.167 
 
Equal opportunity is on the line as well. The surveillance of intimate life 
is particularly costly to women and marginalized people. Consider the 
disproportionate impact of sites trafficking in nonconsensual pornography. 
A majority of the nude images posted online without consent involve 
women and sexual minorities.168 Nonconsensual porn impacts women and 
girls far more frequently than men and boys. Individuals who identify as 
sexual minorities are more likely than heterosexual individuals to 
experience threats of, or actual, nonconsensual pornography.169 As Ari 
Waldman has found, gay and bisexual male users of geosocial dating apps 
are more frequently victims of nonconsensual pornography than both the 
general population and the broader lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
communities.170 The damage stems from prevailing stereotypes and the 
social construction of sexuality. When heterosexual men appear in videos 
having sex, they are socially empowered by the performance whereas 
women and sexual minorities are demeaned, disempowered, and viewed 
as stigmatized.171 
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We see the disproportionate impact on women featured on deep fake 
sex video sites. According to a 2019 study, 96 percent of all of the 15,000 
deep fake videos online are deep fake sex videos and 99 percent of those 
videos involve inserting women’s faces into porn without consent.172 In the 
past year, the number of deep fake sex videos have grown exponentially as 
have deep fake sex videos featuring women without consent.173 
 
Consider the fem-tech market’s potential disproportionate impact on 
women.174 According to media reports, some employers and health 
insurers have access to employees’ period- and fertility-tracking apps. 
Women’s intimate information could be used to raise the cost of employer-
provided health insurance, adjust wages, or scale back employment 
benefits.175 It could impact the ability to obtain life insurance, keep jobs, and 
get promotions. Medical researcher Paula Castano explains that the 
information tracked by fertility apps raise concerns because they offer little 
insight as a medical clinical matter and “focus on variables that affect time 
out of work and insurance utilization.”176  
 
If intimate information is shared with data brokers, it could be used in 
the scoring of individuals, to their detriment. As the Federal Trade 
Commission explains, data brokers’ scoring processes are not transparent, 
which means that “individuals cannot take actions to mitigate the impact 
of negative scores, such as being limited to ads for subprime credit or 
receiving different levels of service from companies.”177 “An insurance 
company could use scoring products to infer that individuals to classify 
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individuals as higher risk.”178 Scoring products could negatively impact the 
interest rates charged on loans.179 News about the disproportionately 
higher creditworthiness of men as compared to women for Apple’s new 
credit card demonstrates the point. 
 
Reservoirs of intimate information shared with advertisers and sold to 
data brokers make their way into the hands of vendors who use that data 
to train algorithms used in hiring, housing, insurance, and other crucial 
decisions.180 As more intimate information is collected, used, and shared, 
the more it will be used to entrench bias. People’s sexual assaults, abortions, 
painful periods, HIV infections, escort use, extramarital affairs, and porn 
preferences may be used to train job-recruitment and housing-matching 
algorithms.181 A wealth of scholarship and research explores the 
discriminatory impacts of algorithmic discrimination in the commercial 
sector.182 A prevailing concern is that algorithmic tools “replicate historical 
hierarchies by rendering people along a continuum of least to most 
valuable.”183  
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The opacity of commercial algorithms makes identifying and 
challenging discrimination difficult.184 But examples do exist. Consider, for 
example, Amazon’s experimental hiring tool that ranked job candidates by 
learning from data about the company’s past practices. A Reuters story 
revealed that the hiring algorithm downgraded resumes from candidates 
who attended all-women’s colleges along with any resume that included 
the word “women’s.”185 Amazon abandoned the tool when it could not 
ensure that it was not free of bias against women. 
 
B. Surveying the Harm  
  
The wide-spread collection, storage, use, and disclosure of intimate 
information risks emotional, physical, and reputational harm. It makes 
people vulnerable to manipulation, blackmail, and extortion.186 The 
examples of suffering are as plentiful as they are disturbing.  
 
Consider the aftermath of the hack of Ashley Madison for John Gibson, 
a married father and Baptist minister who was just one of many exposed in 
the hack. He committed suicide days after the public learned about the 
hack. Gibson’s wife explained that her husband’s suicide note described his 
deep shame about having his name on the site. She   explained her husband 
was mourning the loss of his job. As his daughter explained, Gibson 
resigned—or was urged to resign—after the church learned about the 
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assessment”). Indeed, career staff in the offices of state attorney generals have told me that 
the most challenging problem is figuring out which of the countless vendors to target with 
civil investigative demands and the likelihood that those demands will be met by claims 
of trade secrecy. 
185 J. Dastin, Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women, 
REUTERS, available at https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-
insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-
idUSKCN1MK08G/.  
186 For a superb discussion of such risks for governmental and private sector collection 
of personal data, see Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 
1953-54 (2013). 
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site.187 “We all have things we struggle with, but it wasn’t so bad that we 
wouldn’t have forgiven it. But for John, it carried such a shame, and he just 
couldn’t see that,” she noted.188 Gibson’s son spoke at his memorial service, 
noting that shame killed his father.189 Gibson’s fear about losing his job was 
well-founded. Victims of sexual-privacy invasions have been fired or 
encountered great difficulty obtaining work.190 
 
Stories abound of scammers using emails and passwords hacked from 
porn sites to blackmail people. Criminals write to individuals claiming they 
recorded them watching porn online and demanding money to keep the 
videos secret. For seven months in 2018, victims lost 332,000 dollars to these 
scams. More than 89,000 people were targeted, and on average they paid 
540 dollars. Increasingly, criminals are targeting high-earning victims, 
including company executives, doctors, and lawyers.191 
 
The national security implications of this kind of activity are also 
significant. The concentration of sensitive information on dating sites 
presents an inviting target for governments seeking leverage over political 
activists, dissidents, or foreign agents.192 National security experts raised 
these concerns after the Chinese government bought the gay dating app 
                                                 
187 Jon Robson, Episode 5: The Yes Ladder, BUTTERFLY EFFECT PODCAST (aired November 
3, 2017), https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/the-butterfly-effect-with-jon-
ronson/e/52105431?autoplay=true. 
188 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mbvd/pastor-exposed-by-ashley-
madison-hack-commits-suicide. 
189 Jon Robson, Episode 5: The Yes Ladder, BUTTERFLY EFFECT PODCAST (aired November 
3, 2017), https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/the-butterfly-effect-with-jon-
ronson/e/52105431?autoplay=true. Gibson was not the only suicide related to the hack of 
Ashley Madison. Two Canadian citizens killed themselves in the wake of the leak. Chris 
Baraniuk, Ashley Madison: Suicides over website hack, BBC (Aug. 24, 2015). 
190 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); see, e.g., Complaint, 
FTC et al. v. EMP Media, No. 18 CV 00035, at ¶ 47 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2018) (victims of 
nonconsensual pornography attest to fear of losing jobs). 
191 Isobel Asher Hamilton, Criminal Groups Are Offering $360,000 Salaries to Accomplices 
who can Help them Scam CEOs about their Porn Watching Habits, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 24, 
2019). 
192 “Tinder is the fourth dating app in the nation to be forced to comply with the 
Russian government’s request for user data, Moscow Times reports, and it’s among 175 
services that have already consented to share information with the nation’s Federal 
Security Service, according to a registry online.” Melanie Ehrenkranz, The Russian 
Government Now Requires Tinder to Hand Over People's Sexts, GIZMODO (June 3, 2019, 12:05 
PM), https://gizmodo.com/the-russian-government-now-requires-tinder-to-hand-over-
1835201563. In response to these reports a Tinder spokesperson asserted that “this 
registration in no way shares any user or personal data with any Russian regulatory bodies 
and we have not handed over any data to their government.” Id. 
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Grindr.193  Peter Mattis, a former U.S. government analyst and China 
specialist, remarked: “What you can see from Chinese intelligence practices 
is a clear effort to collect a lot of personal information on a lot of different 
people, and to build a database of names that’s potentially useful either for 
influence or for intelligence. Then later, when the party-state comes into 
contact with someone in the database, there’s now information to be 
pulled.”194 
 
Criminals and hostile states are not the only ones who exploit intimate 
information in ways that undermine people’s well-being. When companies 
use people’s acute emotional fragility or membership in a protected class to 
override their wishes, their actions can be viewed as a “dark pattern.”195 
“The Spinner” exemplifies the troubling nature of dark patterns. It 
promises to bend the will of people’s intimate partners with its advertising 
services. The online service sends innocent-looking links to people via text 
that, when clicked, creates cookies that send targeted advertisements.196 
The company claims to have swayed people to get back together, to initiate 
sex, and to settle their divorces. The company’s most requested service is 
its “initiating sex campaign,” which sends ads trumpeting reasons why 
people should initiate sex.  
 
Another illustration of troubling manipulation is period-tracking app 
FEMM, which uses subscribers’ intimate information to dissuade them 
from terminating their pregnancies. An anti-abortion group runs the app, 
but it does not tell that to subscribers.197 The app’s marketing materials 
                                                 
193 Steven Blum, What Does a Chinese Company Want with Gay Hookup App Grindr?,  LOS 
ANGELES MAG. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/grindr-china-fbi/.  
194 Josh Rogan, Can the Chinese government now get access to your Grindr profile?, Wash. 
Post (Jan. 12, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-
rogin/wp/2018/01/12/can-the-chinese-government-now-get-access-to-your-grindr-
profile/.  
195 STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS 240-41(2019). As the Stigler Report 
notes, using personal data to manipulate people can be benign such as by serving them 
ads for restaurants around lunchtime. Id. Yet the practice is morally and legally troubling 
when sensitive data is used to manipulate people. Id. The Stigler Report invokes the 
concept of dark patterns to evaluate user-interface systems that nudge people to disclose 
information that they otherwise would not disclose if they had time to consider the 
implications. Such systems might not be understood as deceptive under traditional 
understanding of consumer protection laws. Id. at 249. 
196 Parmy Olson, For $29, This Man Will Help Manipulate Your Loved Ones With Targeted 
Facebook and Browser Links, FORBES (January 15, 2019, 7:20 a.m.); Fiona Tapp, New Service 
Promises to Manipulate Your Wife Into Having Sex With You, ROLLING STONE (August 18, 2018, 
11:38 am EST). 
197 Jessica Glenza, Revealed: Women’s Fertility App Run By Anti-Abortion Campaigners, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 30, 2019), 
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simply say: “Are you looking to track your menstrual cycles and symptoms, 
get pregnant or avoid pregnancy? The FEMM app is more than just a period 
tracker: it provides you with cutting edge science that helps you keep track 
of your health, understand what is going on with your body, flag potential 
issues and connect with a network of doctors and nurses to provide you the 
best health care. We’re a new revolution in women’s health!”198 The app 
provides materials claiming that birth control is unsafe and highlighting 
information that promotes pregnancy. The app misleads subscribers about 
its motives and propagates misinformation. 
 
C. Understanding the Legal Landscape 
 
In the United States, information privacy law does little to curtail the 
private sector’s amassing of vast amounts of intimate information, at least 
outside the provision of health care.199 It generally presumes the propriety 
of commercial collection of personal data.200 As William McGeveran 
explains in his influential privacy casebook, American law treats the 
processing of personal data as both inevitable and pro-social.201  
 
1. Privacy Legislation 
 
American privacy law generally does not curtail data collection.202 
Instead, it focuses on procedural protections, such as ensuring the 
transparency of corporate data practices (referred to as notice) and securing 
certain rights over personal data (referred to as choice).203 Even its more 
                                                 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/30/revealed-womens-fertility-app-is-
funded-by-anti-abortion-campaigners. 
198 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.femmhealth.femm&hl=en_US 
199 The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 is the rare exception. It limits 
the collection of children’s online information to instances where parents have explicitly 
provided consent. Similarly, in the EU, the GDPR protects information pertaining to 
individuals’ “sex life” as sensitive information, precluding its collection except upon 
explicit consent. 
200 Danielle Keats Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
1139, 1141 (2018). 
201 WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 382-83 (2016); Danielle 
Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the 
Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007). 
202 Citron, Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, supra note, at 771. Some states 
limit commercial contexts in which Social Security numbers and zip codes can be collected. 
203 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2016); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 
(West 2018). State attorneys general played an important role in getting legislation passed 
to require privacy policies. Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys 
General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 764-65 (2016). 
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reform-oriented elements sometimes continue this trend. The California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CPPA), enacted in 2018, for example, gives 
consumers the right to know what personal information has been collected 
and to opt-out of its sale.204  
 
So long as companies post privacy policies and offer opt-out rights 
under state law, they can largely collect, use, and sell intimate information 
without limitation.205 It should therefore not be a surprise that Grindr’s 
privacy policy warns that its advertising partners “may be collecting 
information from you.”206 The fem-tech market is doing the same. A recent 
study showed that ten popular fem-tech apps including Clue sold 
subscribers’ personal information to at least 135 companies.207 Individuals 
should not be reassured if companies pledge to de-identify intimate 
information before selling it. Intimate information can be easily re-
identified when combined with other information.208 
 
 Under federal and state law, companies must store intimate 
information in a reasonably secure manner. Legal obligations stem from 
data security,209 data disposal,210 encryption,211 breach notification,212 and 
                                                 
204 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.110, 1798.120 (West 2018). Under the 
California Online Privacy Protection Act, websites must detail the categories of personal 
information that they collect and the categories of third parties with whom that 
information may be shared. On the CCPA generally and its comparison to GDPR, see 
Anupam Chander, Margot Kaminski, and William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, 
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).  
205 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.110, 1798.120 (West 2018). Of course, 
compliance with notice requirements isn’t perfect. For instance, according to researchers, 
only 11 percent of the privacy policies posted by porn sites disclose that third-party 
trackers may be collecting visitors’ information. Maris et al., supra note, at. Many 
consumers will not invoke their opt-out rights due to the stickiness of defaults and the 
sheer number of companies that would to be contacted to make a dent in the effort to 
reduce the trafficking of one’s personal information. See generally WOODROW HARTZOG, 
PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT (2018).  
206 Thomas Germain, Popular Apps Share Intimate Details About You With Dozens of 
Companies, CONSUMER REPORTS (January 14, 2020), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/popular-apps-share-intimate-details-about-
you/ 
207 Rosato, supra note, at. 
208 Daniel Kondor et al., Towards Matching User Mobility Traces in Large-Scale Datasets, 
IEEE, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8470173. 
209 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 1798.81.5(b) (West 2016); Standards for the Protection of 
Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth, 201 Mass. Code Regs. 17.00 
(2010). 
210 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. 42-471 (2015); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 931 2. 
211 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 1798.85(a)(3). 
212 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 1798.82. 
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unfair and deceptive acts and practice (UDAP) laws.213 Companies may 
have a duty to adopt certain data security practices, such as having a 
comprehensive data-security program addressing potential risks to 
consumers.214 As explored below, companies have faced suit for 
inadequately securing intimate information. 
 
One might assume think privacy law limits all of the private sector’s 
collection of intimate information related to health conditions. The crucial 
protections of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA), however, only cover data collected during the provision of 
health care and not health data generally. HIPAA is a health care portability 
law with privacy protections, not a health privacy bill. It covers particular 
healthcare providers (known as covered entities), such as medical practices, 
hospitals, and health insurance companies.215 HIPAA, for instance, requires 
that covered entities obtain consent before using or disclosing individually 
identifiable “protected health information.” That provision does not apply 
to the broad array of non-covered entities, including fem-tech apps, search 
engines, medical information sites, or dating sites.216 When a dating app 
collects information about individuals’ HIV status or when a femtech app 
stores the dates of abortions and miscarriages, it is not constrained by 
HIPAA’s privacy rules.  
 
2. Privacy Policymaking of Law Enforcers 
 
In the rare case, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and state 
Attorneys General (AG) have set norms around the collection and storage 
of intimate information.217 Federal and state UDAP laws provide support 
                                                 
213 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. 42-11-a-110q. 
214 William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1140, 1175-
1180 (2018). 
215 In passing HIPAA in 1996, Congress delegated authority to the Department of 
Health and Human Services to enact national data privacy or confidentiality and data 
security standards. Allen, supra note, at 113-14. DHHS issued its Standards for Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information known as the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 45 CFR 
164.524. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, enacted in 2000, applies only to covered entities—
healthcare providers who engage in certain electronic healthcare transactions, health 
plans, and healthcare clearinghouses like hospital billing providers and insurers. Id. 
216 Period-tracking apps Ovia claims to comply with HIPAA, surely due to the fact that 
the company shares de-identified data with employers who provide health insurance to 
employees. Harwell, supra note, at. 
217 Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 747 (2016). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau also has the authority 
to regulate abusive conduct, at least within the banking and financial services sector. 
Under 12 U.S.C. 5531, an abusive practice is one that materially interferes with the ability 
of consumers to understand a term or condition of a “consumer financial product or 
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for this activity.218 The following examples provide precedent for entities 
handling intimate information in the relevant jurisdictions.  
 
The Massachusetts Attorney General’s office has considered the 
collection of information about women’s visits to abortion clinics, inferred 
from geolocation data, to constitute an unfair and deceptive business 
practice. In 2015, an advertising company in Brookline, Massachusetts was 
hired to bombard “abortion-minded women” with pro-life advertisements 
as they visited certain health providers.219 Geofencing technology was key 
to the effort. It let the advertising company target women’s cell phones as 
they entered “Planned Parenthood clinic[s], hospitals, doctor’s offices that 
perform abortions.”220 Women saw ads entitled “Pregnancy Help,” “You 
Have Choices,” and “You’re Not Alone” that linked to live web chats with 
a “pregnancy support specialist.”221  Once an individual’s device had been 
tagged, then that person would continue to see pro-life ads for the next 
thirty days.222  
 
The Massachusetts AG’s office viewed the company’s collection of 
location data to infer women’s reproductive health as constituting an unfair 
and deceptive business practice.223 For the Massachusetts AG, the 
                                                 
service” or takes unreasonable advantage of their understanding of such a service or 
product’s material risks or of their inability to protect their interests. 
218 The Federal Trade Commission has enforcement authority to police unfair and 
deceptive commercial acts and practices under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act. Id. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, state lawmakers followed the federal 
government’s lead in adopting so-called baby Section 5 acts, that is, UDAP laws. With this 
authority, state attorneys general have served as crucial privacy norm entrepreneurs using 
their authority under state UDAP laws. Id. I had the great fortune of witnessing creative 
state AG privacy policymaking in advising then-California AG Kamala Harris from 2014 
to 2016. Id. 
219 In the Matter of Copley Advertising & John F. Flynn, Assurance of Discontinuance 
(dated April 4, 2017), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/28/2017/04/nDP.pdfhttps://www.mass.gov/news/ag-reaches-
settlement-with-advertising-company-prohibiting-geofencing-around-massachusetts. 
220 Id.¶ 7. 
221 Id. ¶ 10. 
222 Id. ¶ 11. 
223 Id. In a series of consent decrees, the FTC has made clear that it considers geolocation 
information as sensitive information requiring explicit, opt in consent before collecting it. 
See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-approves-final-
order-settling-charges-against-flashlight-app. For a discussion of the norms around 
collection of geolocation data, see Danielle Citron, BEWARE: The Perils of Location Data, 
FORBES, (December 24, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/12/24/beware-the-dangers-of-
location-data/#6037ba1543cb. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that obtaining cell-site 
location data from third parties implicates a search under the Fourth Amendment. United 
States v. Carpenter (finding that location data “holds for many Americans the ‘privacies of 
  38 
advertising firm intruded upon a “consumer’s private health or medical 
affairs or status” resulting in the “gathering or dissemination of private 
health or medical facts about the consumer without his or her consent.”224  
 
The advertising company and the AG’s office entered into a settlement 
agreement under which the company vowed not to use geofencing 
technology near medical centers or physician offices to infer people’s health 
status, medical condition, or medical treatment.225 Although the agreement 
is enforceable only against this specific advertising company (one of the 
limits of governance by settlement agreements), it established a norm 
against the collection of geolocation data to infer consumers’ reproductive 
health data under Massachusetts law.226  
 
In another effort to curtail the collection of intimate data, the FTC sued 
mobile spyware company Retina-X under its UDAP authority in Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.227 The complaint alleged that 
defendant’s spyware injured consumers by enabling stalkers to monitor 
people’s physical movements, sensitive information, and online activities 
without consent.228 The unwanted collection of cellphone activity risked 
exposing victims to emotional distress, financial losses, and physical harm, 
including death.229 The FTC charged that the mobile spyware constituted 
an unfair practice because consumers could not reasonably avoid the secret 
spying and the harm was not outweighed by the countervailing benefits.230 
In 2019, the FTC entered into a consent decree with Retina-X. The defendant 
agreed to obtain express written agreement from purchasers that they 
would use the product only for legitimate and lawful purposes.231 
                                                 
life’” and that a government with access to historic location data “achieves near perfect 
surveillance”); see also United States v. Jones. I have been advising federal lawmakers on 
efforts to provide stronger regulatory protections for location data. This effort is not new. 
In 2014, then-Senator Al Franken proposed the federal Location Privacy Protection Act, 
but the bill failed to pick up traction. See Citron, Spying Inc., supra note, at. 
224 In the Matter of Copley Advertising, ¶ 15 (emphasis added). 
225 Id. ¶ 20. 
226 See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New 
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (2011). 
227 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair and deceptive acts 
and practices. It served as the template for state UDAP laws, which are often referred to as 
mini-FTC Acts. 
228 Complaint, In the Matter of Retina-X Studios, LLC, at ¶ 11-12 (U.S. Fed. Tr. 
Comm’n). 
229 Id. 
230 Id. ¶ 32.  
231 Agreement Containing Consent Order, In the Matter of Retina-X et al. (U.S. Fed. Tr. 
Comm’n); Decision and Order, In the Matter of Retina-X Studios (U.S. Fed. Tr. Comm’n). 
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Regrettably, the defendant was not required to refrain from selling 
monitoring products in the future, a result that shows another of the limits 
of governance by consent decree.  
 
State and federal enforcement efforts have set important precedent 
regarding sites amassing people’s nude images as part of extortion 
schemes. In her capacity as California’s Attorney General, Kamala Harris 
prosecuted operators of sites that encouraged users to post nude photos 
and then charged for their removal.232 In one case, site operator Kevin 
Bollaert faced charges of extortion, conspiracy, and identity theft after 
urging users to post ex-lovers’ nude photos and offering to remove those 
images for hundreds of dollars. Bollaert was convicted of 27 felony counts 
and sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and ten years of mandatory 
supervision.233  
 
The FTC sued another revenge porn operator under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act for exploiting nude images shared in confidence for commercial gain.234 
The operator agreed to shutter the site and delete the images.235 The FTC 
joined forces with the Nevada Attorney General in an investigation of yet 
another revenge porn site that solicited nude images and charged victims 
from $499 to $2,800 for their removal.236 A federal court ordered the site to 
destroy all intimate images and personal information in its possession and 
to pay more than $2 million in penalties.237 
 
Norms around data security have similarly emerged based on federal 
and state enforcement activity. The FTC follows a process-based approach 
to data security, which entails assessing steps taken by entities to achieve 
                                                 
232 Citron, Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, supra note, at 775. 
233 https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-kevin-bollaert-revenge-porn-case-
resentencing-2015sep21-story.html 
234 Complaint, In the Matter of Craig Brittain, No. C-4564 (January 29, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150129craigbrittaincmpt.pdf. 
235 Press Release, FTC, Website Operator Banned from the ‘Revenge Porn’ Business After 
FTC Charges He Unfairly Posted Nude Photos (Jan. 29, 2016); see generally Danielle Citron & 
Woodrow Hartzog, The Decision That Could Finally Kill the Revenge-Porn Business, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2015). CCRI joined together with Without My Consent to file comment 
to the consent decree in that case. Comments of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and 
Without My Consent to the Federal Trade Commission (filed February 23, 2015), available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/02/00007-
93359.pdf. 
236 Complaint, FTC et al. v. EMP Media, No. 18 CV 00035, at ¶ 45 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2018); 
Press Release, FTC, FTC, Nevada Obtain Order Permanently Shutting Down Revenge Porn Site 
MyEx (June 22, 2018). The Nevada Attorney General argued that the site violated state 
UDAP law by intimidating people into paying for the removal of their photos. Id. 
237 FTC et al. v. EMP Media Inc., No. 18 CV 0035 (D. Nev. June 15, 2018). 
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“reasonable security.”238 State attorneys general, adhering to this approach, 
often serve as “first responders” to data breaches, at times in coordination 
with the FTC.239  
 
The FTC and state attorneys general have brought investigations in the 
wake of data breaches involving intimate information. For instance, the 
FTC and the Vermont Attorney General’s office sued the owners of Ashley 
Madison for failing to adequately secure customers’ personal data. The 
Vermont AG’s complaint highlighted the site’s failure to maintain 
information security policy and to use multi-factor authentication.240 The 
complaint alleged that the site’s inadequate security amounted to an unfair 
business practice that risked “significant harm to consumers’ reputation, 
relationships, and personal life” and raised people’s risk of identity theft. 
The case resulted in a consent decree with the FTC and settlements with 
state Attorneys General. 
 
The New York Attorney General’s office similarly investigated Jack’d, a 
gay, bisexual, and transgender dating app, for failing to protect the nude 
images of approximately 1,900 individuals.241 The dating app allegedly 
deceived customers by breaking its promise to ensure the confidentiality of 
photos marked “private.” Although the site had been warned about the 
security vulnerability more than a year earlier, it had failed to take remedial 
action.  
 
3. Private Suits  
 
Civil suits have gained traction for deceptive collections of intimate 
information related to networked sex toys. Subscribers sued vibrator 
manufacturer Lovense for collecting intimate information despite its 
promise that “absolutely no sensitive data (pictures, video, chat logs) pass 
through (or are held) on our servers.”242 The complaint alleged that the 
defendant intruded on the plaintiffs’ privacy by recording their 
communications and activities without consent in violation of the federal 
                                                 
238 Citron, Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, supra note, at. 
239 Id. 
240 Complaint, Vermont v. Ruby Corp., Civ. No. 730-12-16 (dated December 14, 2016). 
241 Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General’s Office, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., Attorney 
General James Announces Settlement With Dating App For Failure To Secure Private And Nude 
Photos (June 28, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-
announces-settlement-dating-app-failure-secure-private-and. 
242 First Amended Complaint, S.D. et al. v. Lovense, No. 18-CV-00688, at 33 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 24, 2018). 
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and state wiretap laws and state privacy tort law.243 Subscribers brought 
similar claims against We-Vibe for recording information about their use of 
the defendant’s vibrators.244 The case settled for 3.75 million dollars. 
 
By contrast, individuals have been unable to hold platforms accountable 
for hosting their nude images without consent.245 Section 230 of the federal 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) has barred their efforts.246 The irony 
is significant—the CDA was principally concerned with censoring porn 
(and was mostly struck down), yet the only part of the law left standing 
now enables the distribution of the very worst kinds of obscenity and 
hateful expression. Under Section 230, providers or users of interactive 
computer services are shielded from liability for under- or over-filtering 
user-generated content.247 Section 230(c)(1) says that providers or users of 
interactive computer services will not be “treated as publishers or 
speakers” for information provided by another information content 
provider.248  
 
Lower federal and state courts have dismissed victims’ civil claims even 
though site operators solicited, chose to republish, or failed to remove 
nonconsensual pornography.249 Section 230 did not bar the state AG and 
FTC suits discussed above because they concerned site operators’ own 
extortion schemes, not their publication of user-generated content.250  
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Individuals have sued companies for failing to properly secure personal 
information. Companies have faced lawsuits in the wake of data breaches, 
but those suits are often dismissed early on in the litigation due to plaintiffs’ 
lack of standing or cognizable harm under state law.251 Those lawsuits have 
a greater likelihood of surviving motions to dismiss if plaintiffs have 
suffered financial harm like identity theft, as opposed to the increased risk 
of such harm.252  
 
One might think anti-discrimination law would serve as a crucial tool to 
preventing the use of discriminatory hiring algorithms in employment 
decisions. The major barrier to private civil rights claims (or even federal 
and state enforcement actions) is the opacity of vendors’ proprietary 
systems. Hiring AI systems may be mining intimate information in ways 
that have a disparate impact on individuals from protected groups but it 
has been impossible to detect and thus private suits are hard to pursue.253 
 
4. Criminal Law 
 
Only a narrow set of commercial practices—spyware and cyberstalking 
apps—implicate the criminal law. As I have explored in prior work, Title III 
of the Wiretap Act includes a provision covering those involved in the 
manufacture, sale, and advertisement of covert surveillance devices.254 
Congress passed that provision, 18 U.S.C. 2512, to “dry up” the source of 
equipment that is highly useful for private nonconsensual surveillance.255  
 
Section 2512 makes it a crime to intentionally manufacture, sell, or 
advertise a device knowing or having reason to know that its design 
renders it “primarily useful” for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, 
or electronic communications.256 Defendants face fines of up to $10,000, up 
to five years imprisonment, or both. Section 2512 covers a “narrow category 
of devices whose principal use is likely to be for wiretapping or 
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eavesdropping.”257 Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have 
similar statutes.258  
 
Nonetheless, prosecutions remain rare. Despite the prevalence of 
spyware and the hundreds of purveyors of cyber stalking apps, federal 
prosecutors have only brought a handful of cases. In September 2014, 
federal prosecutors brought Section 2512 charges against StealthGenie’s 
CEO Hammad Akbar.259 StealthGenie’s spyware app secretly intercepted 
communications to and from mobile phones.260 The federal indictment 
alleged that the app’s target population was “spousal cheat: Husband/Wife 
or boyfriend/girlfriend suspecting their other half of cheating or any other 
suspicious behavior or if they just want to monitor them.”261 A federal judge 
issued a temporary restraining order authorizing the FBI to disable the site 
hosting StealthGenie.262 The defendant pleaded guilty to the charges and 
was ordered to pay $500,000 in fines.263 There have been no subsequent 
reported federal criminal cases against spyware purveyors since the 
StealGenie case. At the state level, prosecutions have been virtually 
nonexistent.264 
 
While criminal law provides a foothold for the prosecution of the 
manufacturers, it has been hampered by the requirement that the device be 
primarily designed for the secret interception of electronic 
communications.265 As privacy advocate James Dempsey argued and as 
prosecutors have confirmed, the small number of prosecutions under 
Section 2512 is attributable to the fact that it is hard to demonstrate that 
equipment is primarily designed for stealth interception of 
communications.266 
 
Individual sexual-privacy invaders are a different matter, as my prior 
scholarship has explored.267 Consider nonconsensual pornography. Today, 
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46 states, D.C., and Guam criminalize the posting of nude photos without 
consent.268 Law enforcement has been slowly but surely pursuing cases 
under those laws.  
III. REIMAGINING PROTECTIONS FOR INTIMATE INFORMATION  
 
This Part sketches some guiding principles for the protection of intimate 
information in the commercial sector. My goal is four-fold: to situate data 
privacy as a matter of civil rights; to stem the tidal wave of data collection; 
to restrict certain uses of intimate data; and to expand the suite of remedies 
available to courts.  
 
A. Reframing the Conversation 
 
In the United States, information privacy is viewed through a consumer 
protection lens.269 The central theme is notice and choice.270 So long as 
businesses provide notice of their data practices, then consumers are treated 
as having elected to trade their data for commercial services.271 The U.S. 
approach has been described as “privacy self-management” and “privacy 
work.”272 
 
The consumer protection model—as it is currently constructed—is both 
descriptively and conceptually flawed.273 Firms provide “notice” in privacy 
policies while “consent” is inferred from people’s decision to visit sites, 
download apps, and purchase goods.274 Both are fictions. As currently 
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constructed, notice rarely provides individuals with relevant information 
that they can understand and use. It rarely, if ever, provides details about 
third-party marketing. It does not seek express, written consent in a form 
designed to inform people about a firm’s practices, and it does not give 
them an option of declining the collection of their personal information if 
they use the service. 
 
Even when firms make an effort at directly notifying individuals about 
their practices, the consent provided is hardly meaningful. Lived 
experience casts doubt on the proposition that people have really consented 
to the trade of their personal data for services.275 When a pop up appears 
online, people tend to click “I Agree” because it is less onerous than reading 
dense privacy policies provided.276 Evan Selinger and Brett Frischmann talk 
about this as a form of manufactured consent and rightly so.277 Individuals 
have difficulty appreciating low-probability harms that nonetheless 
happen to a significant percentage of people.  
 
Further complicating the ability to secure meaningful consent is the fact 
that companies have every incentive, in the words of Woodrow Hartzog, to 
“hide the risks in their data practices though manipulative design, vague 
abstractions, and complex words.”278 Firms’ website interfaces and default 
settings are designed to maximize data collection. As Hartzog explains 
further, businesses “engineer . . . [interactions] to expedite the transfer of 
rights and relinquishment of protections.”279  
 
A consumer protection approach not only fails to satisfy its goal of 
notice and choice, it insufficiently captures the stakes.280 To be sure, a firm’s 
collection of intimate data might constitute deception if its privacy policy 
says one thing and does another. But, in addition, it might undermine the 
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crucial values that sexual privacy protects and impede a fair chance to 
work, obtain housing, afford insurance, and express oneself.281 The 
consumer protection model lacks the capacity and even the vocabulary 
with which to protect these interests.282 
 
In certain contexts, law protects crucial life opportunities and social 
goods as civil rights.283 Federal and state civil rights laws secure the ability 
to work, attend school, use the telephone, secure housing, and vote on equal 
terms.284 I am not suggesting that civil rights laws apply to the private 
sector surveillance of intimate data, which they mostly do not.285 
Nonetheless, a civil rights framing brings into focus that far more than 
consumer choices are in jeopardy when firms amass intimate 
information.286 The ability to engage in life’s crucial activities hangs in the 
balance, especially for women, sexual minorities, and racial minorities and 
often on an intersectional basis. 
 
Situating sexual privacy in the civil rights conversation is important.287  
Law plays a crucial expressive role.288 It teaches us why certain interests 
matter and why they warrant law’s protection.289 A civil rights framing 
would attest to the close relationship between reservoirs of intimate data 
and opportunities essential for human flourishing. I am not suggesting that 
civil rights laws cover all freedoms and social goods in need of protection 
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(they do not).290 Their reach is further limited by the state action doctrine.291 
These limitations curtail the expressive power of those laws.292 
Nonetheless, situating private sector surveillance of intimate life as a matter 
of civil rights and not just consumer choices helps begin the conversation 
about what those freedoms should be in the context of privacy law 
specifically and civil rights law more generally. 
 
Some legislators and law enforcers have underscored the connection 
between privacy and civil rights. New York AG Letitia James attributed her 
investigation of the gay dating app Jack’d to the special importance of 
privacy to the LGBTQ community. As she noted, “[a]pproximately 80 
percent of the app’s users were individuals of color and had reason to fear 
discrimination from the exposure of their personal information or private 
photographs.”293  
 
Understanding privacy as a matter of civil rights provides inspiration 
for reform. Data protection laws tend to focus on process, such as notice of 
an entity’s data practices and the ability to correct mistakes.294 By contrast, 
civil rights law moves in a more substantive direction by limiting certain 
conduct and requiring affirmative obligations.295 Under civil rights law, 
caretakers of crucial spaces must maintain them in ways that promote equal 
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access and holds them accountable when they fail to do so.296 School 
administrators, private employers, hotel proprietors, and restaurant 
owners have responsibilities to ensure that their spaces are free of 
discrimination and abuse.297 Educational institutions and employers must 
craft and enforce anti-discrimination policies, and they must respond to 
credible complaints of sexual harassment or racial abuse. Hotels and 
restaurants must ensure that individuals are not denied service on the basis 
of protected characteristics.  
 
Privacy law should follow this substantive turn. We see a measured 
move in that direction in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. A bill 
recently proposed by Senators Warner and Blumenthal frames the 
recognition of a “right to privacy” in “emergency health data” as a civil 
rights matter.298 It requires the adoption of reasonable safeguards against 
unlawful discrimination based on emergency health data. It prohibits 
discrimination against, or otherwise making unavailable, goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation” and the right to vote on the basis of “emergency health 
data.” The bill would have the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
work with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the FTC to submit a 
report examining how the collection, use, and disclosure of COVID-19 
health information impacts civil rights issues.  
Recognizing privacy as a matter of civil rights may provide support for 
stronger privacy protections at the federal and state level. Information 
privacy is having a zeitgeist moment. Dozens of federal privacy bills are 
under consideration. At the state level, privacy laws are being proposed at 
a rapid clip.299 A civil rights framing might incentivize lawmakers to adopt 
robust privacy protections rather than watering bills down and letting bills 
die in committee. If privacy bills are described as consumer protection 
matter, then lawmakers will be more comfortable arguing that the 
profitability of firms should be balanced against consumer interests. 
Lawmakers would be less inclined to barter away civil rights against 
discrimination to protect firms’ profits or to reduce administrability 
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costs.300 Indeed, in some circumstances, civil rights do not allow for any 
bartering at all—this is certainly true voting. 
 
In recognizing privacy’s centrality to human flourishing, the U.S. would 
move in a direction that most of the world has already adopted. In the 
European Union, information privacy (better known as data protection) is 
a “fundamental right” essential for “dignity, personality, and informational 
self-determination.”301 This is not a wholesale endorsement of the EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation—its overall tack is overly focused on 
procedural commitments.302 Instead, it is to note that most of the world 
views data privacy as a human right.  
 
B. Special Protections for Intimate Information 
 
Before turning to the special protections owed intimate information, I 
have to note the need for strong baseline protections for all personal data 
collected in the private sector.303 All of the reasons why we need sexual 
privacy support comprehensive data protection in the United States. 
Technological advances may soon enable firms to turn innocuous personal 
data into sensitive information—including intimate information—with a 
high degree of accuracy.304 Paul Ohm and Scott Peppet have memorably 
termed this prospect “when everything reveals everything.”305 We need to 
stem the tide of over-collection and to restrict downstream use, sharing, and 
storage of personal data in part to protect intimate information. 
 
No matter, whether or not lawmakers move on any of the countless 
comprehensive data privacy bills under consideration at the federal and 
state level Intimate information warrants special protection right now. This 
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section focuses on areas worthy of reform. Certain activity should be off 
limits, including the collection and use of intimate information in certain 
contexts. Additional remedies should be available to address violations, 
including a “stop processing” order until violations are fixed. We might 
also consider reserving the possibility of a data death penalty. 
 
1. Limits on Collection  
 
The default assumptions around the handling of intimate information 
must change. The norm of collection is not inevitable, unless law and 
society make it so. The status quo undermines the values that sexual 
privacy protects and risks people’s well-being.  
 
To be sure, the collection of intimate information can produce more 
upside than downside in certain contexts. Law should work to ensure that 
collection occurs in those contexts and no others. To be sure, no legal 
approach can guarantee this outcome. The following reforms, however, are 
offered with that goal in mind. 
 
Firms should be required to obtain meaningful consent before collecting 
intimate information. The “gold standard of consent” combines the 
“knowing and voluntary” waiver standard from constitutional law and the 
informed consent standard from biomedical ethics.306 Requests for consent 
also must be “infrequent [and] the risks of giving consent must be vivid and 
easy to envision.”307 Last, firms can only seek consent to collect intimate 
data for a legitimate business purpose. 
 
As to the knowing requirement, requests for consent should be clear and 
understandable. They should explain what intimate data would be 
collected, how it would be used by the firm to provide its service, and how 
long it would be retained. Requests for consent should be conspicuous. 
Where possible, they should be made separately from the process of signing 
up for a service. They should be designed in a way that enhances the 
likelihood that people will understand them.308 Lessons from design 
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psychology can be leveraged to make it more likely that people consider the 
question rather than simply clicking “I Agree.”309  
 
As for voluntariness, requests for consent must not be “take it or leave 
it” if a firm can provide that service without collecting intimate data. Adult 
sites, for instance, do not need to track people’s searches to provide their 
services. Thus, people should be able to decline collection requests and still 
be able to browse adult sites. Firms also should not make it difficult for 
people to deny requests or engage in other activity designed to “coerce, 
wheedle, and manipulate people to grant it.”310 
 
The context of the request should signal that the person answered the 
request with care. Firms should not be permitted to make several 
requests.311 They must limit their requests. When requests for consent are 
infrequent, individuals have time to consider them and likely will not feel 
overwhelmed. With frequent requests, individual just agree to stop being 
hasseled.312 Firms also should spell out the risks in concrete and vivid terms 
so that individuals understand what happens if their intimate data is leaked 
or improperly used or shared. 
 
Under this approach, first-party data collectors would have to obtain 
people’s meaningful consent before amassing intimate information. They 
could only request consent to collect intimate data for a legitimate business 
reason. Sometimes, however, the collection of intimate data is necessary for 
the service to function at all. This is true of dating, fertility, and period-
tracking apps. In such a case, requests for collection would have to make 
clear that the service depends upon the collection of intimate data and that 
it will be used only to provide that service and no other reason. In that case, 
firms could decline to provide services to people who reject their request. 
 
No so for third-party data collectors. Third-party data collectors must 
make clear that individuals can decline their requests without consequence. 
This recommendation would alter the ground rules for the marketplace of 
intimate information. At present, third-party advertisers and data brokers 
do not have to ask people for permission to track their intimate data. If 
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adopted, they would not only have to seek permission from individuals, 
but requests would have to be made so that people can easily refuse and 
know that their refusals will have no consequences (beyond not getting 
personalized ads). 
 
Admittedly, this requirement would be a significant setback for 
advertisers and data brokers. Data brokers would have to seek explicit 
consent before collecting intimate information. So would advertisers that 
track intimate information on porn sites, period-tracking services, and 
dating apps. To be clear, meaningful consent would only apply to intimate 
information. The advertising and data brokerage industries would not end. 
Instead, the default presumption that intimate information can be collected 
unbeknownst to individuals and without their permission would have to 
end. The sky will not fall. 
 
My experience working with companies and lawmakers on the 
nonconsensual hosting of nude images informs this approach. Cyber Civil 
Rights Initiative President and my frequent coauthor Mary Anne Franks 
has long argued that nude images should not be posted online without 
written consent. After the first California Cyber Exploitation Task Force in-
person meeting in the spring of 2015, Franks suggested as much to a tech 
company safety official. Her suggestion, wise then and wise now, was met 
with shock and dismay. The safety official—a thoughtful person with 
extensive content moderation experience—explained that social media 
companies could not possibly require prior written consent before nude 
images were posted online. Why not, we asked? The official responded that 
if written consent was required, then it might be more likely that nude 
photos would not be posted because the subjects of those photos would not 
give their consent.  
 
Then, as now, we wondered what the problem was.313 As we noted then, 
written consent would not prevent the posting of nude photos, just nude 
photos where the subject did not consent (or at least where the poster was 
not willing to sign something saying that the subject consented to the 
posting). This sentiment applies not only to sites trafficking in 
nonconsensual pornography and deep fake sex videos, but also data 
brokers and advertisers. If firms want to collect intimate information, then 
they should obtain people’s meaningful consent to do so.  
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Privacy laws covering certain sensitive information often include 
affirmative consent requirements though they fall short of the “gold 
standard.” The Illinois Biometric Identification Privacy Act conditions the 
collection of biometric data on consent given after a firm informs consumers 
of the fact that biometric information is being collected and stored, the 
reason for the collection, use, and storage, and the duration of the storage.314 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule permits data use necessary for the treatment, 
payment, or health care system operations data and requires consent for 
any uses beyond those purposes. Under federal law, cable providers 
generally may not disclose subscribers’ information to anyone without 
subscribers’ consent.315 
 
An alternative approach to seeking meaningful consent would be to 
limit the collection of intimate information to instances where entities have 
a legitimate, reasonable basis for collecting intimate data and where 
individuals would reasonably expect it.316 The advertising industry would 
surely prefer this approach. Advertisers have a legitimate business reason 
for collecting personal data and their practices might comport with people’s 
reasonable expectations depending on the context. The outcome would be 
different for data brokers. People do not reasonably expect that unknown 
shadowy actors are amassing their intimate information in digital dossiers. 
In my view, this approach is far less compelling than requiring meaningful 
consent. The data collection imperative for intimate data would continue 
with too little friction restraining it. 
 
Certain collection practices should be off-limits. Law should prohibit 
services whose raison d’être is the nonconsensual collection of intimate 
data. Period the end, no exceptions. Software that “undresses” women in 
                                                 
314 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/20(2). 
315 Cable Privacy Protection Act. The European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation requires opt-in consent for the placement of tracking cookies. For sensitive 
information including information about individuals’ sexuality, companies can only 
collect such information with explicit, affirmative consent.  
316 See the thoughtful proposals of Cameron F. Kerry in Proposed Standards for Data 
Collection in Privacy Legislation, Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/data-
collection-standards-privacy-legislation-proposed-language (“Collection and processing 
[defined terms] of personal data shall have a reasonable, articulated basis that takes into 
account reasonable business needs of the [covered entity/controller/etc.] engaged in the 
collection balanced with the intrusion on the privacy and the interests of persons whom 
the data relates to”). Kerry noted, and I agree, that his proposal would “take provisions or 
rulemaking that exclude certain sensitive data fields or targeting to establish boundaries 
for behavioral advertising. . . . even if behavioral advertising in general is considered a 
reasonable business purpose, this collection language could be construed as barring 
Target’s processing of purchasing data to deliver ads for maternity products to a secretly 
pregnant teenager as an excessive intrusion on her privacy and interests.” 
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photographs runs afoul of this mandate; so do apps that facilitate the secret 
and undetectable monitoring of someone’s cellphone and sites hosting 
nonconsensual pornography and deep fake sex videos.317 To ensure that 
this reform would apply to revenge porn sites and their ilk, Congress 
should amend the federal law shielding online services from liability for 
user-generated content, as I have long argued they should.318 
 
We have recognized no-collection zones in other contexts. American law 
has long banned the collection of information crucial to the exercise of civil 
liberties. Under the Privacy Act of 1974, for instance, federal agencies are 
precluded from collecting information that exclusively concerns 
individuals’ First Amendment activities. In NAACP v. Alabama, the 
Supreme Court struck down a court order requiring the civil rights group 
to create and produce its membership list on the ground that privacy in 
group associations is indispensable to preserving the freedom to 
associate.319 Apps and services designed to facilitate the collection of 
intimate information without individuals’ permission are an equal affront 
to civil rights and civil liberties, and they should be prohibited.  
 
To wrap up this discussion, it is worth noting the synergy between 
limits on collection and limits on the retention of intimate information. 
Restrictions on collection should be paired with an obligation to delete or 
otherwise destroy intimate information as soon as it is no longer needed to 
fulfill the purpose prompting its collection. This obligation would minimize 
the potential for leaks or the sale of intimate data.320 The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act and the Video Privacy Protection Act similarly require the 
destruction of records from background checks or movie watching as soon 
                                                 
317 Such a rule would reinforce the legal practice of pornography—the recording and 
sharing of nude imagery with the subject’s explicit consent.  
318 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act secures a shield from liability for 
sites that under- or over-filter content provided by another information content provider. 
My prior work has explored suggestions for amending Section 230 and so I will not belabor 
the point here. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note; Danielle Keats Citron 
& Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech Conversion Machine and Other Myths 
Confounding Section 230 Reform, U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming); Danielle Keats Citron, 
Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet As It Is (And As It Should Be), 118 
Mich. L. Rev. 1073 (2020); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not 
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017); Citron, 
Cyber Civil Rights, supra note. 
319 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). 
320 Seda Gürses et al, Engineering Privacy by Design Reloaded, available at 
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Engineering-PbD-Reloaded.pdf. 
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as practicable.321 Under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, 
personal data can be kept only for as long as is necessary to fulfill the 
original basis for its collection and processing.322  
 
2. Use Restrictions 
 
Policymakers should restrict the uses of personal data to protect the 
values secured by sexual privacy and reduce the risks to well-being. 
Companies collect massive quantities of personal information on the 
expectation that someday it will generate significant returns. As Paul Ohm 
observes, “chasing profits, companies hoard data for future, undefined 
uses; redistribute it to countless third parties; and repurpose it in ways their 
customers never imagined.”323  
 
Personal data collected for a legitimate business purpose should not be 
repurposed to infer people’s intimate information without obtaining 
separate consent. This mirrors the approach of the Fair Information Practice 
Principles (FIPPs).324 The FIPPs are the foundation both for most privacy 
laws in the United States and around the world, as well as for most 
understandings of information ethics. Under the FIPPs, information 
obtained for one purpose cannot be used or made available for other 
purposes without the person’s consent.325 That restriction is often referred 
to as a “secondary use limitation.” 
 
Under this approach, a social media company could not use its 
subscribers’ personal data to infer their sexuality, HIV status, and 
miscarriages without seeking meaningful consent. It could not use 
subscribers’ intimate information to infer other intimate information 
without seeking meaningful consent. Subscribers’ intimate information, of 
                                                 
321 15 U.S.C. 1681w (discussing disposal of records in consumer financial information 
context); 18 U.S.C. 2710(e) (requiring destruction of old records in context of video rental 
or sale records). 
322 Article 5, Principles Related to the Processing of Personal Data, General Data Protection 
Regulation, section 1(c) (“personal data should be adequate, relevant and limited to what 
is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (‘data 
minimisation’)”). 
323 Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2015). 
324 The FIPPs were first articulated by privacy scholar Alan West in 1967 and 
popularized by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973. See ALAN 
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); 
https://epic.org/privacy/consumer/code_fair_info.html. 
325 https://epic.org/privacy/consumer/code_fair_info.html; Privacy Policy 
Guidance Memorandum Department of Homeland Security (December 29, 2008) 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-policy-guidance-
memorandum-2008-01.pdf. 
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course, could be used for the purpose for which it was collected and for 
which firms obtained meaningful consent. This would include allowing 
subscribers to message each other and to post intimate information.  
 
We need clear rules against the exploitation of intimate information to 
manipulate people to act in ways consistent with another’s ends rather than 
their own. As explored in Part II, law enforcers have investigated uses of 
personal data to target the vulnerabilities of protected groups as unfair 
commercial practices.326 Such cases, however, remain rare. A ban would 
make clear that such practices are unlawful and would discourage 
enforcement actions directed at such exploitative practices.327 More 
broadly, privacy law should require firms to act in the best interest of 
individuals whose intimate data they have collected consistent with a duty 
of loyalty and care.328 
 
Strong use restrictions would protect the values that sexual privacy 
secures and prevent harms explored in this piece. Individuals would not 
have their sexual autonomy undermined by a dating app’s secret sharing 
their HIV status, sexual fantasies, or sex toy use with advertisers. They 
would not suffer blows to their self-esteem due to the posting of their nude 
photos on revenge porn sites or the inclusion of their sexual assault in data 
brokers’ dossiers. They would not be chilled from using reproductive-
health apps for fear that their struggles with painful periods or infertility 
would undermine their job opportunities or raise their insurance 
premiums. 
  
3. Remedies: Halt Processing and the Data Death Penalty 
 
Injunctive relief against improper processing of intimate data should be 
part of the suite of remedies for the very worst offenders.329 Privacy debates 
of late have focused on the wisdom of recognizing civil actions for damages 
                                                 
326 HARTZOG, supra note, at 131 (explaining that UDAP laws are designed to prevent 
the exploitation of human vulnerabilities). 
327 Jaime Luguri & Lior Strahelivitz, Shining a Light on Dark Pattern, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3431205. 
328 Richards & Hartzog, Duty of Loyalty, supra note, at; Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies 
of Consent, supra note, at 1500 (arguing that lawmakers should create rules designed to 
protect our trust—meaning “being discreet with our data, honest about the risk of data 
practices, protective of our personal information, and, above all, loyal to us, the data 
subjects”). 
329 The topic of privacy remedies has not attracted sustained attention with notable 
exceptions. For such an exception, see the important work of Lauren Henry Scholz. See, 
e.g., Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 1 (2019). Scholz argues for the 
recognition of restitution as privacy remedy. 
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or administrative fines.330 Injunctive relief, however, has not been a key part 
of the discussion, but it should be.  
 
Privacy legislation should recognize judicial power to order injunctive 
relief in cases for serial offenders. In such a case, injunctive relief should be 
mandatory to assure meaningful protection of sexual privacy and make 
clear its priority over competing interests.331  
 
As for substantive duties so for remedies: Civil rights law provides a 
model for reform. Injunctive relief is a core feature of civil rights law.332 
Federal, state, and local anti-discrimination statutes permit injunctive 
relief,333 and courts have employed equitable remedies in flexible and 
creative ways.334 In workplace sexual harassment cases, courts have 
ordered employers to implement anti-harassment policies and procedures, 
provide training, retain personnel records, and install security cameras.335  
 
Lawmakers should recognize a court’s power to order parties to halt 
processing intimate information for repeat offenders. Figuring out if a firm 
qualifies as a repeat offender would entail several steps. Under the first 
step, the court would issue an order directing the party to fulfill its legal 
                                                 
330 The debate has largely centered on private rights of action. Industry lobbyists 
strongly oppose privacy bills that include private rights of action. Private rights of action 
are essential given the limited resources available to federal and state law enforcers. 
331 Lawmakers must make clear that such injunctive relief is automatic. In the absence 
of clear legislative intent, courts are reluctant to order equitable remedies. Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). There is an extensive scholarly 
debate about whether courts should be required to issue injunctions to remedy statutory 
violations. Michael T. Morley, Enforcing Equality: Statutory Injunctions, Equitable Balancing 
under eBay, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U. CHI. L. FORUM 177 (2014). In the environmental 
context, Daniel Farber argues that when statutes impose absolute duties on people, 
injunctive relief is essential to prevent future violations. Daniel A. Farber, Equitable 
Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PIT. L. REV. 513, 515 (1984). 
332 OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 6 (1978) (explaining that injunctive 
relief was understood after Brown v. Board of Education as the most effective way to 
guarantee civil rights). For a thoughtful exploration of how courts exercise their equitable 
powers granted under Title VII, see Michael T. Morley, Enforcing Equality: Statutory 
Injunctions, Equitable Balancing under eBay, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U. CHI. L. FORUM 
177 (2014). 
333 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 204(a); 43 Pa. Stat. 962(c)(3); Availability of 
Injunctive Relief under State Civil Rights Acts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 174, 180 (1956). In some 
civil rights statutes, injunctions are the only available remedy. For instance, Title III of the 
Americans with Disability Act only allows injunctive relief as opposed to monetary 
damages. Dudley v. Hannaford Brothers Co., 333 F.3d 299, 304 (1st Cir. 2003).  
334  
335 See, e.g., United States v. Greenwood Community School Corp. (S.D. Ind.); Carey 
v. O’Reilly Auto. Stores, 2019 WL 3412170 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2019). 
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obligations. If the court is presented with clear evidence that the party has 
violated the first order, then the court would turn to the second step. Under 
the second step, the court would order (the second order) the firm to stop 
processing intimate data until compliance has been achieved as shown by 
an independent third-party audit.336 For the final step, if the court is shown 
clear evidence that the party has failed to comply for the third time, then 
and only then would the court impose what can be called the data death 
penalty—an order permanently stopping the firm from processing intimate 
information.  
 
Under a stop-processing order, providers of cyberstalking apps and 
sites devoted to nonconsensual pornography would have to halt their 
services.337 An adult site would be ordered to stop collecting individuals’ 
searches without meaningful consent. Such orders would be crucial to 
securing an effective remedy to individuals whose sexual privacy had been 
repeatedly violated. 
 
There is nothing novel about a halt processing remedy. Under Article 58 
of the GDPR, data protection authorities have authority to impose 
temporary or permanent bans on the processing of personal data. Halt 
processing orders must be “appropriate, necessary, and proportionate” to 
ensure compliance with legal obligations.338 In 2019, the Hamburg 
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Hamburg 
Commissioner) started an administrative procedure to stop Google 
employees and contractors from listening to voice recordings of Google 
Home device subscribers for three months.339  The Hamburg Commissioner 
explained that, “effective protection of those affected from eavesdropping, 
documenting, and evaluating private conversations by third parties can 
only be achieved by prompt execution.”340 Google responded by pledging 
not transcribe voice recordings collected from its personal assistant 
device.341   
                                                 
336 A schedule would be set to report the auditor’s findings to the court. 
337 In the case of revenge porn sites and their ilk, such relief would depend upon 
changes to Section 230 as explored in note. 
338 Recital 129 of the GDPR. 
339 Hamburg Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, Speech 
Assistant Systems Put to the Test (August 1, 2019), available at https://datenschutz-
hamburg.de/assets/pdf/2019-08-01_press-release-Google_Assistant.pdf. The GDPR 
permits data protection authorities to take measures to protect the rights of data subjects 
for a period not to exceed three months. Id. 
340 Id. Recall that whistleblowers reported that Google Home was inadvertently 
recording private and intimate conversations and that contractors were transcribing those 
conversations in order to analyze whether the device was correctly processing information. 
341 Id. Google seemingly has not altered its position. 
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EU data protection authorities had been issuing halt-processing orders 
even before the GDPR’s adoption. For instance, Ireland’s data protection 
authority ordered Loyaltybuild to halt processing personal data for three 
months after learning that the firm’s data breach involved the personal data 
of 1.5 million people. The firm was directed to notify clients about the 
security breach, delete certain data, and achieve compliance with PCI-DSS 
standards for the processing of credit card data.342 It took the company 
seven months to fulfill those obligations.  
 
To be sure, even temporary stop-processing orders exact significant 
costs. Loyaltybuild lost millions of Euros in revenue, a considerable blow 
to the firm.343 For some entities, halting processing for even a month might 
cause their collapse. New entrants will no doubt find it more challenging to 
absorb the costs of stop-processing orders than established entities.344 But 
the grave risk to individuals and society posed by the handling intimate 
information warrants strong remedies.  
 
C. Objections  
 
The new compact will raise questions about the market and free speech. 
This section addresses some concerns about the broader social welfare 
consequences of my reform proposals. It explains why the reform proposals 
enhance free speech values and would withstand First Amendment 
challenge.  
 
1. Market 
 
These proposals would surely change the value proposition for many 
online services. A significant number of apps and services explored above 
do not charge fees for their services because they earn advertising money.  
                                                 
342 https://iapp.org/news/a/cease-processing-orders-under-the-gdpr-how-the-irish-
dpa-views-enforcement/ 
343 Id. The behemoth Google halted transcriptions of conversations captured by 
personal devices with little impact on its bottom line.    
344 At a faculty workshop, my colleagues David Webber and Michael Meuer asked me 
about potential perverse incentives of stop-processing orders. Might new entrants collect 
intimate information in violation of the law and then just shut down and restart in a game 
of endless whack a mole? That is surely possible depending on the start-up costs and 
availability of necessary financing. Criminals have certainly engaged in this sort of whack-
a-mole activity in the face of shut down orders as in the case of AnonIB. See supra note. 
Nonetheless, the reputational costs of this strategy would be significant. New entrants 
seeking third-party capitalization would be less inclined to engage in this sort of behavior.  
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In some markets, third parties may have invested in them as we have seen 
in the sexual wellness and dating markets.345  
 
Firms would look to other revenue sources if advertising fees and 
outside funding dropped significantly. They might charge subscription 
fees. They might keep basic services at low or no cost and increase the costs 
for premium or add-on services. A nontrivial number of people might not 
be able to afford these services. 
 
Non-profit organizations might support efforts to provide some services 
free of charge. The fem tech market seems a likely possibility. Reproductive 
justice organizations might provide funding for period-tracking apps 
providing helpful and truthful information. LGBTQ advocacy groups 
might hire technologists to create dating apps for community members.  
 
Some gaps would remain, leaving some people unable to afford dating 
apps, period-tracking services, and subscriptions to adult sites. Failing to 
protect intimate data exacts too great a cost to sexual privacy even if it 
means that services tracking intimate life remain out of reach for some.  
 
More broadly, we should not discount the role that privacy plays in 
enhancing market operations. As Ryan Calo has explored, a firm’s 
commitment to privacy engenders trust.346 Individuals may be more 
inclined to use services because they believe that a firm’s service is worth 
their price.347 
 
                                                 
345 Dana Olsen, The top 13 VC investors in femtech startups, PITCHBOOK (November 2, 
2016), available at https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/the-top-13-vc-investors-in-
femtech-startups (explaining that a decade ago only $23 million worth of venture capital 
was invested in the global femtech industry whereas there has been nearly $400 million in 
venture capital funding in 2018); Kate Clark, Dating startup raises VC as Facebook enters the 
relationship biz, PITCHBOOK (May 4, 2018), available at 
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/dating-app-raises-vc-as-facebook-enters-the-
relationship-biz (explaining that app-based dating services have attracted venture funding 
including apps like Happn, Hinge, Clover, and The League). 2018 set records for 
investment in apps devoted to women’s and men’s health issues. Dana Olsen, This year is 
setting records for femtech funding, PITCHBOOK (October 31, 2018), available at 
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/this-year-is-setting-records-for-femtech-funding. 
Two venture capital funds have emerged that are devoted exclusively to investing in the 
funding of women’s health enterprises. Id. One of those firms Astarte invested in Lola, 
which provides subscription-based delivery of organic tampons, Flo, the period-tracking 
app, and Future Family, a business offering reproductive-health services. Id. 
346 Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649 (2015). 
347 Id. 
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2. Free Speech 
 
The proposed reforms will garner objections on free speech grounds. 
For some scholars, all data privacy laws regulate “speech” and thus may be 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.348 These arguments illustrate what 
Leslie Kendrick has criticized as “First Amendment expansionism:” the 
“tendency to treat speech as normatively significant no matter the actual 
speech in question.”349 As Kendrick underscored, freedom of speech is a 
“term of art that does not refer to all speech activities, but rather designates 
some area of activity that society takes, for some reason, to have special 
importance.”350  
 
Just because activity can be characterized as speech does not mean that 
the First Amendment protects it from government regulation.351 Neil 
Richards helpfully explains that free speech protections hinge on whether 
government regulations of commercial data flows are “particularly 
threatening to longstanding First Amendment values.”352 Indeed. 
 
The assertion that all speech (or all data) has normative significance 
elides the different reasons why speech (or data) warrants protection from 
particular government regulations but not others.353 Some government 
regulations censor speech central to self-governance or the search for truth 
while others raise no such concerns. Some government regulations imperil 
speech crucial to self-expression while others pose no such threat.354  
 
The proposed reforms would not threaten First Amendment values. The 
nonconsensual surveillance of intimate life is not necessary for the public to 
figure out how to govern itself. Requiring explicit consent to handle data 
about people’s HIV status, abortion, sex toy use, or painful cramps would 
have little impact on discourse about political, cultural, or other matters of 
                                                 
348 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications 
of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 (2000) 
(arguing that government imposed fair information practice rules that restrict the ability 
of speakers to communicate truthful data about others is inconsistent with the basic First 
Amendment principles); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014) 
(arguing that “for all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to the current 
debates in information law, data is speech.”). 
349 Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1199, 
1212 (2015).  
350 Id. 
351 Id. 
352 Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Laws Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WILLIAM & 
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1507 (2015). 
353 Kendrick, supra note, at. 
354 Id. 
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societal concern. People’s miscarriages, erectile dysfunction, abortions, and 
sexual fantasies have nothing to do with art, politics, or social issues. Nude 
photos posted without consent contribute nothing to discussions about 
issues of broad societal interest. Someone’s abortion, miscarriage, and rape 
are not facts or ideas to be debated in the service of truth. 
 
Regulating the surveillance of intimate life with explicit consent 
requirements and narrow no-collection zones would not chill self-
expression but rather secure the conditions for self-expression.355 The 
nonconsensual collection of people’s sex toy habits or porn site searches 
undermines their willingness to engage in sexual expression. People whose 
nude photos appear on revenge porn sites have difficulty interacting with 
others and often retreat from online engagement and self-expression.356  
 
The Supreme Court has made clear the inextricable tie between the 
absence of privacy protections and the chilling of self-expression. In 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court observed that “the fear of public 
disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on 
private speech.”357 In Carpenter v. United States, the Court held that 
pervasive, persistent police surveillance of location information enables 
inferences about one’s sexuality and intimate partners so as to chill 
“familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”358  
  
With the proposed reforms, people would be less fearful of engaging in 
intimate expression and interaction. If individuals trust firms to use 
intimate information only for the purpose for which it was collected and no 
other unless they say otherwise, then they will be more willing to use those 
services to experiment with ideas. They will be more inclined to browse 
sites devoted to gender experimentation and to express themselves on 
dating apps.   
 
For all of these reasons, the Court has made clear that laws regulating 
speech about “purely private matters” do not raise the same constitutional 
                                                 
355 Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital 
Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1379 (2018). 
356 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, at 195. 
357 532 U.S. 514 (2001). See Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, supra note, at 208-210 
(discussing the Court’s recognition in Bartnicki v. Vopper that privacy protections foster 
private speech). 
358 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). See also David Gray & Danielle 
Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 77 (2013) (exploring the 
chilling effect of indiscriminate, continuous police collection of geolocation data). 
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concerns as laws restricting speech on matters of public interest.359 As the 
Court explained in Snyder v. Phelps, speech on public matters enjoys 
rigorous protection “to prevent the stifling of debate essential to democratic 
self-governance.”360 In contrast, speech about “purely private matters” 
receives “less stringent” protection because the threat of liability would not 
risk chilling the “meaningful exchange of ideas” and “robust debate on 
public issues.”361 Its restriction “does not pose the risk of a reaction of self-
censorship on matters of public import.” To illustrate a “purely private 
matter,” the Court pointed to an individual’s credit report and videos 
showing someone engaged in sexual activity.362 The proposed reforms 
suggested here relate to purely private matters, including videos showing 
someone engaged in sexual activity.  
 
The proposed reforms comport with First Amendment doctrine.363 
Rules governing the collection of information raise few, if any, First 
Amendment concerns.364 These rules “prohibit information collection by 
separating the public sphere from the private.”365 Trespass laws, intrusion 
on seclusion tort, and video-voyeurism statutes have withstood 
constitutional challenge.366 Courts have upheld laws requiring informed 
consent before entities can collect personal data, such as the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA), federal and state wiretapping laws, and the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).367 It is also worth 
noting that the reform proposals turn on people’s explicit consent. The 
Court has held that “private decision making can avoid government 
partiality and insulate privacy measures from First Amendment 
                                                 
359 As Kenneth Abraham and Edward White argue, the “all speech is free speech” view 
devalues the special cultural and social salience of speech about matters of public concern 
Kenneth S. Abraham & Edward G. White, First Amendment Imperialism and the 
Constitutionalization of Tort Liability, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3437289. 
360 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). For an extended discussion of Snyder v. 
Phelps, see CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, at 215. 
361 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216 (noting that the “content of a particular person’s credit 
report ‘concerns no public issue’ and was speech solely in the individual interest of the 
speaker and its particular business audience” and that “videos of an employee engaging 
in sexually explicit acts did not address a public concern” because it “did nothing to inform 
the public about any aspect of the [employing agency’s] functioning or operation”). 
362 The employee’s loss of public employment was constitutionally permissible because 
the videos shed no light on the employer’s operation and instead concerned speech on 
purely private matters. 
363 Richards, supra note, at. 
364 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 
1149, 1182 (2005). 
365 Id.  
366 NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2015). 
367 Id. 
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challenge.”368 Indeed, explicit consent is part and parcel of data collection 
laws like FCRA and COPPA. 
 
As Neil Richards argues, “information collection rules do not fall within 
the scope of the First Amendment under either current First Amendment 
doctrine or theory.”369 These rules “are of general applicability, neither 
discriminating against or significantly impacting the freedoms guaranteed 
by the First Amendment.”370  The Supreme Court has held that even media 
defendants enjoy no privilege against the application of ordinary private 
law in their efforts to collect newsworthy information.371   
 
Trespassers cannot avoid liability by contending that they infringed 
others’ property rights in order to collect information.372 Computer hackers 
cannot avoid criminal penalties by insisting that they were only trying to 
obtain information.373 Websites cannot avoid responsibility under COPPA 
by insisting that they should not have to ask for parental consent because 
they need access to children’s online information. Employers cannot avoid 
liability under FCRA by arguing that they are just trying to learn about 
people and so should not have to ask for permission to see their credit 
reports.  
 
Reform proposals restricting the use of intimate information without 
explicit consent would not run afoul of the First Amendment. Countless 
laws restrict certain uses of personal information, from state and federal 
antidiscrimination laws and trade secret laws to FCRA and census rules.374 
Laws restricting secondary uses of information have not been held to 
violate the First Amendment.375 In Bartinicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court 
assessed the First Amendment implications of the Wiretap Act’s 
prohibition on the use or disclosure of intercepted communications. The 
Court underscored that “the prohibition on the ‘use’ of the contents of an 
illegal interception . . . [is] a regulation of conduct” whereas the prohibition 
of the disclosure or publication of information amounts to speech.376 
                                                 
368 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2669 (citing Rowan v. Post Office, 
397 U.S. 728 (1970)). 
369 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 
1149, 1186 (2005). 
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371 Id. at 1188 (noting that in Cohen v. Cowles, the Supreme Court held that the press 
may not with impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news”). 
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374 Id. at 1190-91. 
375 Id. at 1194. 
376 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527. 
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Sorrell v. IMS Health,377 decided in 2011, does not cast doubt on the likely 
constitutionality of the collection and use restrictions suggested here. In 
Sorrell, the Court struck down a Vermont law banning two types of 
activities. First, the law prohibited pharmacies, health insurers, or similar 
entities from disclosing doctors’ prescription data for marketing purposes. 
Second, the law prohibited pharmaceutical companies and health data 
brokers from using doctors’ prescription data for marketing purposes 
unless the medical prescriber consents.378 Data brokers and an association 
of pharmaceutical companies challenged the regulations on the grounds 
that they violated their free-speech rights.  
 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, struck down the law on First 
Amendment grounds. Under First Amendment doctrine, discrimination 
against particular speakers or messages—known as viewpoint-based 
discrimination—is “virtually always invalid.”379 The Court found that the 
law did precisely that. It held that the law “imposes a burden based on the 
content of the speech and the identity of the speaker.”380 The majority 
underscored that the law “imposed content- and speaker-based restrictions 
on the availability and use of prescriber-identifying information.”381  
 
As the majority found, the law told pharmacies and regulated entities 
that they could not sell or give away prescription data for marketing 
purposes but it could be sold or given away for purposes other than 
marketing.382 Under the law, pharmacies could share prescriber 
information to academics and other private entities. The Court explained, 
“The State has burdened a form of protected expression it has found too 
persuasive. At the same time, the State has left unburdened those speakers 
whose messages are not in accord with its own views. This the State cannot 
do.”  
 
The Court found viewpoint discrimination in the law’s targeting of 
specific speakers—data brokers and pharmaceutical companies—and not 
others. As the majority noted, academic institutions could buy prescription 
data “in countering the messages of brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and in promotion the prescription of generic drugs,” but 
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pharmaceutical companies and detailers “were denied the “means of 
purchasing, acquiring, or using prescriber-identifying information.”383  
 
The majority rejected the state’s argument that the consent provision 
insulated the law’s use restriction from constitutional concerns.384 The 
problem was that the “state gave doctors a contrived choice: Either consent, 
which will allow your prescriber-identifying information to be 
disseminated and used without constraint; or, withhold consent, which will 
allow your information to be used by those speakers whose message the 
State supports.” The majority explained that privacy could be chosen only 
if it “acquiesce[d] in the State’s goal of burdening disfavored speech by 
disfavored speakers.”385 
 
The Court held that the state failed to provide a sufficiently compelling 
reason to justify the law and that the state’s interest was proportional to the 
burdens placed on speech and that the law sought to “suppress a 
disfavored message.” The law failed to advance the interest of medical 
privacy, as the state claimed, given that it did not restrict the sale or use of 
prescriber data for countless reasons other than marketing.386 The majority 
emphasized that the law “allowed prescriber data to be studied and used 
by all but a narrow class of disfavored speakers.”  
 
Some have suggested that Sorrell casts doubt on the constitutionality of 
data protection laws in recognizing that “a strong argument exists that 
prescriber-identifying information is speech for First Amendment 
purposes.”387 But the majority went out of its way to say that its finding did 
not spell the end for all privacy law. Instead, Justice Kennedy, in dictum, 
seemingly affirmed the constitutionality of sectoral privacy laws like the 
federal health privacy law. He explained if Vermont had “advanced its 
asserted privacy interest by allowing information’s sale or disclosure in 
only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances” as in HIPAA, the law 
would have been constitutional.388  
 
Neil Richards contends that the Sorrell holding is quite narrow. In his 
telling, the Court struck down the law not because it regulated data flows 
amounting to protected speech but because it lacked a “more coherent 
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policy” and imposed impermissible viewpoint restrictions.389 Richards has 
the better reading here. The majority explained that it had “no need to 
determine whether all speech hampered by [the law] is commercial” or 
pure speech.390 Instead, it focused on the viewpoint discrimination—that 
the law sought to “suppress a disfavored message”—and the state’s failure 
to show that the law directly advanced a substantial government interest 
and the measure was drawn to achieve that interest.391 Crucially, as 
Richards explains, the Court made clear that the “law would have been less 
problematic if it had imposed greater duties of confidentiality” (as well as 
requirements of explicit consent and use restrictions) on the data.392 
CONCLUSION 
 
This is an auspicious time to call for a new compact for sexual privacy. 
Dozens upon dozens of privacy bills are under consideration at the federal 
and state levels. Privacy law reform should provide special protections for 
intimate information to protect the values that sexual privacy secures and 
to prevent certain harms to people’s well-being, including their ability to 
work, study, get loans, obtain insurance, and find housing. Those 
protections should include limitations on collection and the recognition of 
no-collection zones. We should widen the available remedies to include 
injunctive relief. This Article aims to begin the conversation about why a 
new compact for sexual privacy is needed and how we might go about 
doing that. 
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